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By ROBERT D. BRUSSACK*
Symbolic twigs and clumps of soil no longer are essential
props at real estate closings1 but modern American conveyancing
does have its rituals. In most states, for example, a transferee
should insist that the transferor appear before a notary public and
acknowledge execution of the conveyance.2 The transferee also
should make certain that the notary affixes a proper certificate of
acknowledgment to the conveyance. An omitted or defective ac-
knowledgment will not invalidate the conveyance between the par-
ties in most states,8 but it may well produce other calamitous con-
sequences. The defectively formalized conveyance often is not
eligible for recording in the official land records,4 and even if the
transferee makes sure the instrument is physically placed in the
records where a reasonably diligent title searcher would find it, the
conveyance will not be given effect as constructive notice of the
transaction. 5 Thus, a subsequent purchaser who fails to search the
records, or who searches them poorly, may prevail over the initial
transferee6 simply because the earlier conveyance lacks a proper
notary's certificate. Moreover, the defectively formalized convey-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B.J., 1971, University of Georgia;
J.D., 1976, University of Georgia. The author would like to thank Gregory Alexander,
Richard Wellman, and Michael Wells for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. These props were ceremoniously employed in livery of seisin. See T. BERGIN & P.
HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTEREsTE 12 (1966). The ceremony
never really caught on in the colonies. See text accompanying note 19 infra.
2. The acknowledgment and related formalities are explained at notes 22-26 & accom-
panying text infra.
3. See note 34 & accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 56-59 & accompanying text infra.
5. See note 60 & accompanying text infra.
6. If the sub.sequent purchaser sees the defectively formalized conveyance in the land
records, however, he or she probably will be charged with actual notice and therefore will
take subject to the earlier interest. See note 66 & accompanying text infra.
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ance may be useless as evidence of title in any litigation. The
transferee who claims title under the conveyance probably will be
forced to make some preliminary showing of the instrument's au-
thenticity before the court will allow the instrument into evidence.7
A properly acknowledged conveyance, on the other hand, is both
admissible in evidence8 and entitled to a relatively strong pre-
sumption of genuineness.9
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws10 has concluded that no persuasive reasons exist for attaching
so much significance to the ritual of acknowledgment.11 The Con-
ference recently completed a major reworking of the American law
of real property transfers and proposed two 12 uniform acts, one
of which- the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act
(USLTA)-virtually would eliminate the necessity of an acknowl-
edgment or kindred formality in American conveyancing.13 Under
7. See notes 99-114 & accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 107-11 & accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 115-19 & accompanying text infra.
10. The National Conference is composed of commissioners from each state, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The first National Conference was held in 1892. Its
object is to promote uniformity of state laws in areas where uniformity would be desirable
and practicable. The National Conference drafts uniform statutes in such areas and recom-
mends them for adoption by the states. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 955-56 (1974).
11. See UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS Acr (USLTA), Prefatory Note
(amended 1977).
12. The National Conference approved the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA)
in 1975 and the USLTA in 1976. Amendments were adopted in 1977. The Commissioners'
original plan had been "to produce a single comprehensive code regulating land transac-
tions, much as the Uniform Commercial Code regulates commercial transactions." Maggs,
Remedies for Breach of Contract Under Article Two of the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, 11 GA. L. REv. 275, 275 (1977). In 1975, however, the commissioners chose to divide the
reform effort into several separate acts. Id. Despite this division of effort, both the ULTA
and the USLTA borrow structure and principles from the Uniform Commercial Code. See
ULTA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note. See, e.g., USLTA § 1-103, Comment; USLTA, His-
torical Note (amended 1977).
The ULTA deals with contractual transfers of real estate. See generally Kratovil, The
Uniform Land Transactions Act: A First Look, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 460 (1975); Summary
of the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 672 (1978) (report of
special American Bar Association Committee). The USLTA includes comprehensive provi-
sions governing conveyancing, recording, priorities, and liens. See generally Pedowitz, Uni-
form Simplification of Land Transfers Act-A Commentary, 13 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TI. J.
696 (1978); Comment, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Areas of Depar-
ture from State Law, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 359 (1978).
13. The deemphasis of transactional formality appears in other uniform laws, notably
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). Article Nine
of the UCC, which governs secured transactions, worked a dramatic simplification of the
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the USLTA, a signed conveyance, without other formality, is valid
between the parties,14 is fully recordable, 5 and, when recorded, is
entitled to a strong presumption of genuineness.'
This Article examines the present structure of American con-
veyancing law and analyzes the effect that the adoption of the
USLTA would have on the existing law of real property transfers.
17
The Article next criticizes the justifications advanced for retaining
the formalities of the existing rules. The Article concludes that the
USLTA offers needed reform in the existing law of conveyancing
and should be adopted by the states.
Elements of American Conveyancing Formality
By the time English settlers began arriving in the New World,
the English system of conveyancing had become quite complex,
forcing the growth of a class of professional conveyancers distinct
from other legal practitioners.18 For the most part, American colo-
nists left behind the complicated English rules:
From a very early period of their settlement the colonies adopted
an almost uniform mode of conveyance of land, at once simple
and practicable and safe. The differences are so slight, that they
became almost evanescent. All lands were conveyed by a deed,
formality and formalism which had plagued that branch of commercial law. See Gilmore,
Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. Rav. 659, 661, 675 (1968). The UPC
reduces to a minimum the formalities required for execution of a witnessed will. UPC § 2-
502, Comment. The will execution requirements under the UPC still are more elaborate
than the conveyancing requirements mandated by the USLTA, but greater emphasis on
formality always has been thought necessary for the execution of a will. See notes 97-128 &
accompanying text infra.
14. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
15. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
17. No state has yet adopted either of the conveyancing acts proposed by the Commis-
sioners, and the USLTA provisions that eliminate some of the existing formalities were
questioned strongly by some members of the American Bar Association (ABA) Committee
that studied the act. The committee members defended conveyancing formality as a guard
against fraud. "It was argued by analogy that even the transfer of a simple corporate stock
certificate requires some guaranty of the signature." Pedowitz, Uniform Simplification of
Land Transfers Act-A Commentary, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. J. 672, 701 (1978). The
drafters responded that the troubles caused by the acknowledgment requirement and kin-
dred imposed formality "tremendously outweigh" the supposed benefits of such devices to
prevent fraud. Id. The contention that formality prevents fraud is examined in greater
detail later in this Article. Both the ULTA and USLTA now have been approved by the
ABA. Id. at 696 nn.1-2.
18. 7 W. HoLnswoRTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 384-85 (2d ed. 1937).
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commonly in the form of a feoffment, or a bargain and sale, or a
lease and release, attested by one or more witnesses, acknowl-
edged or proved before some court or magistrate, and then regis-
tered in some public registry. When so executed, acknowledged,
and recorded, they had full effect to convey the estate without
any livery of seisin, or any other act or ceremony whatsoever."'
The unavailability of legal expertise and the frequency with which
land changed hands prevented the English system from being eas-
ily transplanted to the colonies.20 Cumbersome formalities that
were tolerable in England, where land transfers were important to
the conservation of family wealth and power, were ill-suited to the
colonies where land functioned more as a commodity in an open
market.21 Perhaps a lingering perception that the American con-
veyancing process was streamlined in comparison with its English
ancestor partly explains the long interval during which the Ameri-
can law of land transfers has remained substantially unaltered, de-
spite persistent evidence that some changes would be beneficial.
Every state's conveyancing rules give significance to some for-
mal device beyond the familiar requirement of a signed writing,
imposed by a statute of frauds. One or more of three related spe-
cies of formality may be important: acknowledgment, proof by
subscribing witnesses, and attestation. A transferor acknowledges
execution of a conveyance by appearing before a statutorily pre-
scribed official, usually a notary public,22 and by avowing that he
or she has freely executed the instrument. The official appends a
certificate2" to the conveyance reciting that the transferor in fact
appeared and made the required statement.24 Proof by subscribing
19. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 174
(Boston 1833).
20. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 54-55 (1973).
21. Id. at 55.
22. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1180-1181 (West Supp. 1980) (acknowledgment within
state may be made before justice or clerk of supreme court or court of appeals, judge of
superior court, notary public, clerk of municipal or justice court, county recorder, county
clerk, court commissioner, judge of municipal or justice court, district attorney, clerk of
board of supervisors, city clerk, county counsel, or city attorney); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
183, § 30 (West 1977) (acknowledgment within commonwealth may be made before justice
of peace or notary public).
23. For one state's determination of what constitutes a legally sufficient certificate of
acknowledgment, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 25 (Smith-Hurd 1969). See also Uniform
Acknowledgment Act § 7 (forms); Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgments Act §§ 3-6
(forms and definitions).
24. The term "acknowledgment" may refer both to the transferor's statement to the
officer and to the officer's certificate. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d
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witnesses is similar to an acknowledgment, but the witnesses to the
execution of the conveyance, not the transferor, appear before the
notary or other official and state that they witnessed the trans-
feror's execution of the instrument. The official then affixes a cer-
tificate25 to the conveyance similar to the certificate of acknowledg-
ment. Attestation does not involve an official; after witnessing the
transferor's execution of the document, the witnesses merely sign
an attestation clause indicating their participation.26
The consequences of failure to comply with conveyancing for-
malities27 vary among the states. In some states, noncompliance af-
fects the validity of the instrument between the original parties.
More typically, noncompliance affects the rights of the transferee
against third persons.
Validity Between the Parties
The Current Law
An Arkansas statute states that "instruments. . .for the con-
veyancing of real estate . . . shall be executed in the presence of
two [2] disinterested witnesses, or in default thereof shall be ac-
knowledged by the grantor in the presence of two [2] such wit-
nesses ... "28 The Georgia Code provides that "[a] deed to lands
must be . . .attested by at least two witnesses ..... " An Indi-
ana statute states that "[c]onveyances of land. . . shall be by deed
in writing, subscribed, sealed and duly acknowledged by the gran-
tor. . . ."30 Although none of the three statutes specifies any con-
sequences resulting from a failure to utilize the prescribed formal-
ity, courts in these states have held that instruments lacking the
apparently mandatory formality nevertheless are valid between the
906 (1945).
25. For one state's determination of what constitutes a legally sufficient certificate of
subscribing witnesses, see ALA. CODE § 35-4-30 (1975).
26. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.59 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
27. Formality is a lesser aspect of formalism. Formalism requires strict compliance
with prescribed formality. Formalism characterizes current judicial treatment of wills act
formality. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HAnv. L. Rav. 489
(1975). Courts, however, generally hold that substantial compliance with conveyancing for-
mality is sufficient. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Wingard, 89 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1956); Hatcher v.
Hall, 292 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App. 1956).
28. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-417 (1971).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 29-101 (1969).
30. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-2-4 (Burns 1973).
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parties.31
The opinions holding that a conveyance lacking the prescribed
formality is valid between the parties to the transaction often rea-
son that the statutorily prescribed formality adds nothing to the
instrument's validity as a conveyance between the parties, 2 but is
necessary only for proper recordation of the instrument." These
decisions are in accord with the rule adopted in the vast majority
31. McSwain v. Criswell, 213 Ark. 775, 213 S.W.2d 383 (1948) (unacknowledged deed
is good between parties); Jackson v. Allen, 30 Ark. 110 (1875) (unattested or unacknowl-
edged deed confers equitable title under which grantee is entitled to hold possession); All-
good v. Algood, 230 Ga. 312, 196 S.E.2d 888 (1973) (attestation affects only recordability);
Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 96 S.E.2d 887 (1957) (deed without
attestation conveys title against grantor and heirs); Cypress Creek Coal Co. v. Boonville
Mining Co., 194 Ind. 187, 142 N.E. 645 (1924) (void acknowledgment does not affect validity
of instrument between parties or as to parties with actual notice); Bever v. North, 107 Ind.
544, 8 N.E. 576 (1886) (acknowledgment essential for recording, but not essential to give
effect between parties).
These judicial responses are echoed in other jurisdictions. Compare Ma. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 151 (1978) (person may convey by deed to be acknowledged and recorded as
provided) with Gibson v. Norway Say. Bank, 69 Me. 579 (1879) (object of acknowledgment
is to entitle deed to be registered; estate passes to grantee even absent acknowledgment);
compare MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 565.1 (1967) (conveyances may be made by acknowl-
edged deed or by proved and recorded deed) and id. § 565.8 (deeds shall be executed in
presence of two witnesses) with Turner v. Peoples State Bank, 299 Mich. 438, 300 N.W.
353 (1941) (acknowledgment has no effect on validity of conveyance between parties, its
purpose being to admit deed to record); Kerschensteiner v. Northern Mich. Land Co., 244
Mich. 403, 221 N.W. 322 (1928) (unwitnessed deed good between parties but should be wit-
nessed in order to be recorded); and Brown v. McCormick, 28 Mich. 215 (1873) (acknowl-
edgment is not constituent part of conveyance, and deed lacking acknowledgment will prove
transfer of title between parties and against those chargeable with notice); compare Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 442.020 (Vernon 1952) (conveyance may be made by deed executed, acknowl-
edged, and recorded without any other act or ceremony whatsoever) and id. § 442.130 (con-
veyances shall be acknowledged or proved) with Elsea v. Smith, 273 Mo. 396, 202 S.W. 1071
(1918) (title vests in grantee without acknowledgment as if formalities of statute had been
complied with because purpose of section is to protect creditors and subsequent purchasers);
compare Nan. REv. STAT. § 76-211 (1976) (deed must be signed, acknowledged or proved,
and recorded) and id. § 76-216 (Supp. 1978) (grantor must acknowledge instrument) with
Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Dev. Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974)
(unacknowledged instrument good between parties) and Martin v. Martin, 76 Neb. 335, 107
N.W. 580 (1906) (acknowledgment goes to the right to have deed recorded and is not essen-
tial to validity); compare NEv. REv. STAT. § 111.240 (1979) (every conveyance shall be ac-
knowledged or proved and certified) with Allen v. Hernon, 74 Nev. 238, 328 P.2d 301 (1958)
(no statute voids deed as between parties for failure of acknowledgment); compare OF. Rv.
STAT. § 93.010 (1977) (conveyance may be made by deed signed, acknowledged, and re-
corded) with Houck v. Darling, 238 Or. 484, 395 P.2d 445 (1964) (acknowledgment not es-
sential to validity of deed between parties).
32. E.g., Bever v. North, 107 Ind. 544, 8 N.E. 576 (1886); Gibson v. Norway Sav. Bank,
69 Me. 579 (1879).
33. E.g., Allgood v. Allgood, 230 Ga. 312, 196 S.E.2d 888 (1973).
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of American jurisdictions that a conveyance is valid between the
parties although unacknowledged, unproved, and unwitnessed.3 4 In
many states, the legislation that sets forth the requirements for a
conveyance makes no reference to any formality beyond a signed
writing,"' and in at least three states, statutes provide that convey-
ances are valid between the parties despite noncompliance with
statutory formality.3 "
34. See Kimbro v. Kimbro, 199 Cal. 344, 249 P. 180 (1926) (conveyance valid between
parties without acknowledgment); American Nat'l Bank v. Silverthorn, 87 Colo. 345, 287 P.
641 (1930) (conveyance valid between parties without acknowledgment in absence of stat-
ute); Chun Chew Pang v. Chun Chew Kee, 49 Haw. 62, 412 P.2d 326 (1966) (deed valid
between parties without acknowledgment); Mollendorf v. Derry, 95 Idaho 1, 501 P.2d 199
(1972) (acknowledgment not required except for purpose of recording); Zilvitis v. Szczudlo,
409 fI1. 252, 99 N.E.2d 124 (1951) (deed passes title without acknowledgment); Shanda v.
Clutier State Bank, 220 Iowa 290, 260 N.W. 84i (1935) (assuming acknowledgment defec-
tive, validity between parties not affected); Tawney v. Blankenship, 150 Kan. 41, 90 P.2d
1111 (1939) (acknowledgment has reference only to proof of execution and not to force of
instrument between parties); Blankenship v. Green, 283 Ky. 700, 143 S.W.2d 294 (1940)
(unacknowledged deed good between parties and conveys title to grantee); Jacobs v. Jacobs,
321 Mass. 350, 73 N.E.2d 477 (1947) (acknowledgment not necessary for validity of deed
between parties); Brown v. Reinke, 159 Minn. 458, 199 N.W. 235 (1924) (acknowledgment of
instrument not necessary for validity); Kelly v. Wilson, 204 Miss. 56, 36 So. 2d 817 (1948)
(defectively acknowledged deed good between parties); Taylor v. Holter, 1 Mont. 688 (1872)
(acknowledgment not essential for validity of deed between parties); Hastings v. Cutler, 24
N.H. 481 (1852) (as to grantor and heirs, deed sufficient to convey estate under statute of
uses without any witnesses); Kitchen v. Canavan, 36 N.M. 273, 13 P.2d 877 (1932) (acknowl-
edgment not essential to validity of conveyance between parties); Strough v. Wilder, 119
N.Y. 530, 23 N.E. 1057 (1890) ("well settled that ... title under [un]acknowledged and
unattested deed... is good as between the parties"); Watson v. Kresse, 130 N.W.2d 602
(N.D. 1964) (unless homestead of married person involved, transfer of estate need not be
acknowledged or witnessed to be valid); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Denison, 165 Ohio St. 89, 133
N.E.2d 329 (1956) (defectively executed conveyance of interest in land is valid between par-
ties in absence of fraud); Stovall v. Liberty Plan of America, Inc., 414 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1966)
(effective acknowledgment not necessary to make mortgage binding between parties); Ban-
bury v. Sherin, 4 S.D. 88, 55 N.W. 723 (1893) (deed operative to pass title although defective
acknowledgment certificate); Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967) (deed valid
between grantor and grantee without valid acknowledgment); Peatross v. Gray, 181 Va. 847,
27 S.E.2d 203 (1943) (acknowledgment necessary for recordation but not to convey title).
35. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1091 (West 1954); IDAHO CODE § 55-601 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 1 (West 1977);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-1 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-101 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-10-01 (1978); S.D. CoP. LAWS ANN. § 43-25-1 (1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1288 (Vernon 1980).
36. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-1 (Supp. 1979) (unacknowledged and unrecorded con-
veyance, if delivered, valid and binding as between parties and heirs, and as against those
taking by gift or devise or those having notice thereof); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-6 (1974)
(instruments valid between parties and as to all who have actual notice without acknowledg-
ment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.02 (West Special Pamphlet 1980) (no acknowledgment re-
quired for validity of conveyance). Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-13-12 (1978) (acknowledgment
January 1981]
Some states have recognized the equitable validity of instru-
ments lacking the requisite formality, thus distinguishing between
legal and equitable property interests on the basis of the presence
of formalities such as attestation or acknowledgment. In Alabama,
for example, a conveyance either must be attested by at least one
witness 7 or must be acknowledged.38 The Alabama courts have in-
terpreted this statutory mandate to mean that an unattested and
unacknowledged conveyance cannot pass a legal interest in the real
estate. The same cases, however, also state that such a conveyance
can create an interest in the transferee, enforceable in equity, as an
agreement to convey the legal interest.39 Arizona' 0 and Connecti-
cut4 1 have enacted statutes expressly providing for the equitable
validity of instruments lacking the requisite formalities. Courts in
Maryland 2 and Vermont43 also have given limited recognition to
the concept of equitable validity.44 In some states, cases hold that
not necessary to execution unless expressly so provided by statute). See note 45 & accompa-
nying text infra; cf. notes 37-44 & accompanying text infra (equitable validity).
37. "Conveyances for the alienation of lands must be written or printed, or partly
written and partly printed, on parchment or paper, and must be signed at their foot by the
contracting party or his agent having a written authority; or, if he is not able to sign his
name, then his name must be written for him, with the words "his mark" written against
the same, or over it; the execution of such conveyance must be attested by one witness or,
where the party cannot write, by two witnesses who are able to write and who must write
their names as witnesses; or, if he can write his name but does not do so and his name is
written for him by another, then the execution must be attested by two witnesses who can
and do write their names." ALA. CODE § 35-4-20 (1975) (emphasis added).
38. "The acknowledgement provided for, in this article operates as a compliance with
the requisitions [sic] of section 35-4-20 upon the subject of witnesses." Id. § 35-4-23.
39. E.g., Lavender v. Ball, 267 Ala. 104, 100 So. 2d 331 (1958); Golden v. Golden, 256
Ala. 187, 54 So. 2d 460 (1951); Niehuss v. Ford, 251 Ala. 529, 38 So. 2d 484 (1949); Lowery v.
May, 213 Ala. 66, 104 So. 5 (1925); Sparks v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Co., 87 Ala. 294, 6 So.
195 (1888).
40. ARiz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 33-437 (1974) (instrument in writing and intended as con-
veyance that fails to take effect as conveyance because of statutory provisions is valid as
contract upon which conveyance may be enforced as far as rules of law permit). See Murphy
v. Brown, 12 Ariz. 268, 100 P. 801 (1909); Heller v. Levine, 7 Ariz. App. 231, 437 P.2d 983
(1968); Keck v. Brookfield, 2 Ariz. App. 424, 409 P.2d 583 (1966).
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-17 (West 1978) (unacknowledged deed may operate as
conveyance of equitable interest).
42. Adams v. Avirett, 252 Md. 566, 250 A.2d 891 (1969) (deed of trust with void ac-
knowledgment may be enforced in equity as between the parties).
43. Vermont Accident Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 87 Vt. 394, 89 A. 480 (1914) (equity may
treat unwitnessed deed as evidence, although not conclusive, of an agreement to execute
deed).
44. "But it is urged that the deed is good in equity and would be enforced in a court of
chancery; and that the existence of an equitable incumbrance is a sufficient breach to sus-
tain this action. But it can not be affirmed that any equitable incumbrance was ever created
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informal conveyances are valid between the parties, but the opin-
ions leave some doubt whether the result is based solely on the
notion of equitable validity.
45
by the deed, or that it is operative or would be enforced; especially after the death of the
grantor, and after the title to the land has passed to a subsequent purchaser who may be a
bona fide purchaser without notice. The recording of such defective deed is not constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers. It is true that in a court of equity the execution of such a
deed is treated as evidence of an agreement to execute a valid deed, but not conclusive. The
relief that chancery affords in such case is in the nature of a decree for a specific perform-
ance, but it is not a matter of course that relief is granted. It depends on too many contin-
gencies for a court of law to treat the deed as valid upon the assumption that a court of
equity would enforce it on application for that purpose. To do so would in effect be to hold
the deed valid at law, and dispense with the aid of a court of equity in such cases." Day v.
Adams, 42 Vt. 510, 515-16 (1869).
Although the Maryland courts long have recognized that unacknowledged instruments
intended as legal mortgages or deeds of trust could be given effect in equity, see Price v.
McDonald, 1 Md. 403 (1851), there is also authority in Maryland that an unacknowledged
gift of an interest in land will not be enforced in equity, see Berman v. Berman, 193 Md.
614, 69 A.2d 271 (1949). The difference between Berman and the Maryland mortgage cases
seems to be that the Berman court was unable to find any consideration to support the
unacknoiledged instrument. Thus, the Maryland authority underscores the point made by
the Vermont court that the source of equitable validity of a conveyance may be equity's
willingness to view the defectively formalized instrument as a specifically enforceable con-
tract for which consideration must be present.
45. An early South Carolina case, Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Fudge, 113 S.C. 25,
100 S.E. 628 (1919), gave conflicting signals about the source of validity of an unwitnessed
mortgage, adverting both to equitable validity and to the notion that a mortgage will not be
void between the parties unless a statute specifically mandates such invalidity as a conse-
quence of failure to comply with statutory formality- "[Tihe mortgage, even without wit-
nesses, would have been good between the parties; and the fact that the witnesses may be
disqualified by interest would not have the effect of destroying its validity. A mortgage at-
tested by witnesses, who are incompetent by reason of interest, stands upon the same foot-
ing as if it were without witnesses ...
"It was also held in Harper v. Barsh, [31 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich. Eq. 149 (1858))] that a
mortgage with a single subscribing witness is void as a legal mortgage, but could be enforced
in equity. The effect of the defective execution of a will is quite different from that of a
mortgage. Section 3564 of the Code of Laws provides that wills shall be attested, in the
presence of three or more credible witnesses, 'or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect,' while section 3453 provides that in order for a deed to be valid and effectual to carry
the fee simple, it shall be executed in the presence of two or more credible witnesses. There
are, however, no such words in section 3453 as 'or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect.' The mere disqualification of a witness does not render a mortgage void, but there
must be a provision of law to that effect." 113 S.C. at 36-37, 100 S.E. at 632. The Fudge case
was cited in Smith v. Hawkins, 254 S.C. 423, 175 S.E.2d 824 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
999 (1971), for the proposition that a deed without witnesses is valid between the parties,
but Smith did not distinguish between equitable and legal validity.
Ambivalence about the concept of equitable validity also is present in Alaska, see Smal-
ley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296, 1300 n.11 (Alaska 1972) (court noting dis-
tinction in earlier decision between legal and equitable validity but declining to speak to the
question of the continuing significance of the distinction); New Jersey, compare Holloway v.
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The jurisdiction perhaps most hostile to the idea that a deed
is valid between the parties despite its failure to comply with pre-
scribed formality is Florida. The Florida statute provides that
"[n]o estate or interest of freehold, or for a term of more than one
year... shall be. . .transferred. . . in any other manner than
by instrument in writing, signed in the presence of two subscribing
witnesses .... ,46 The Florida courts have limited the effect of the
statute by holding that it does not apply to contracts for the sale
of land, even though such contracts may be specifically enforced,
47
or to mortgages.48 At least one Florida court has held that a deed
lacking witnesses may take effect as a mortgage. 49 When the stat-
ute does operate, however, it deprives a deed of validity equitably
as well as legally. In Santos v. Bogh,50 the defendant argued that a
deed signed by only one witness should be regarded as a contract
creating an equitable interest in the grantee. The court agreed that
a real estate contract without witnesses could be specifically en-
forced, but it declined to apply that rule to an instrument which
plainly was not a contract but a deed.51 Perhaps the Santos result
would have been different if the deed's proponent had introduced
evidence that the quitclaim deed was supported by consideration,52
but the language of the opinion suggests that Florida courts will
deny validity to an unwitnessed instrument styled as a deed unless
Hendrick, 98 N.J. Eq. 713, 129 A. 702 (1925) (distinction between legal and equitable valid-
ity not discussed in holding that unacknowledged instruments are good between parties)
with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:4-11 (West 1940) (deed which shall fail to take effect because of
noncompliance with statutory formality shall nevertheless be valid and effectual, and shall
bind parties so far as rules of law and equity permit, as if statutory formality was not re-
quired); Washington, compare Anderson v. Thursday, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 54, 455 P.2d 932
(1969) (distinction between legal and equitable validity not discussed in holding unacknowl-
edged deed good between parties) with Edson v. Knox, 8 Wash. 642, 36 P. 698 (1894) (unac-
knowledged deed, even if maintainable as deed, certainly can be maintained as a contract
for a deed conveying equitable title); and Wyoming, compare Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming
Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947) (no mention of a distinction between equitable
and legal validity in holding that absence of formality does not prevent passing of title) with
Conradt v. Lepper, 13 Wyo. 473, 81 P. 307 (1905) (unwitnessed mortgage is "at least" an
equitable mortgage).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.01 (West 1969).
47. See Carroll v. Dougherty, 355 So. 2d 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
48. See Wickes Corp. v. Moxley, 342 So. 2d 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 356
So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1978).
49. See Walker v. City of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
50. 334 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
51. Id. at 834.
52. See note 44 supra.
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the claim specifically asserts that the instrument be treated as a
mortgage."
The USL TA
The USLTA simply abolishes formal requirements as a pre-
requisite to a valid conveyance. Section 2-201(c) of the USLTA
states that "[a] conveyance does not require an acknowledgment,
seal, or witness."" The drafters recognized that "[m]ost states
have never required an acknowledgment for the effectiveness of a
conveyance.
' 55
Validity Against Third Persons
The Current Law
In most states, statutes prescribing the operation of the official
real estate records condition the valid recording of a conveyance
upon the instrument's compliance with prescribed formality. The
statutes commonly provide that, to be recordable, an instrument
either must be acknowledged by the transferor or must be proved
by subscribing witnesses. 8 The recording statutes also make ex-
53. See note 49 & accompanying text supra. In contrast to the rigor of the Santos
decision is the willingness of the Florida courts sometimes to salvage transactions involving
noncomplying instruments by invoking estoppel concepts. See, e.g., Gill v. Livingston, 158
Fla. 577, 29 So. 2d 631 (1947); Bodden v. Carbonell, 354 So. 2d 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
54. USLTA § 2-201(c).
55. Id. § 2-201, Comment 3.
56. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.14.260(a) (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 49-211 (1971); CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 27287 (West 1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 151 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 695.03 (West Supp. 1979); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 502-81 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 55-805
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-2-18 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.42 (West Supp.
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2221 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382.080 (Baldwin 1979); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 203, 306 (1964 & Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183,
§ 29 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-3-1 (1975); Mo. CODE ANN. § 442.380 (Vernon
1949); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-21-203 (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-235 (1976); Nav. REV.
STAT. § 111.310 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:15-1 (West 1940); N.J. CENT. CODE § 47-19-03
(1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAWS § 291 (McKinney 1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 15-16
(West 1951); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.480 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 42, 444 (Purdon
1955); S.C. CODE § 30-5-30 (1976); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 43-28-8 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 64-2201 (1976); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (Vernon Supp. 1979); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-3-1 (1974); VA. CODE § 55-106 (1974); Wyo. STAT. § 34-1-118 (1977).
The recording statutes of a few states omit the proof-by-witnesses alternative. See ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(B) (1974); Mn. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-101 (Supp. 1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-8-4 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-1 (Supp. 1979).
In several other states different formal prerequisites for recording are specified. The
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plicit,57 or have been interpreted to mean,58 that a conveyance
Georgia rules, for example, are quite muddled. GA. CODE ANN. § 29-405 (1969) authorizes
the valid recording of instruments that have been attested or acknowledged "as hereinafter
provided," but the section also states that "nothing herein shall dispense with another wit-
ness where an additional witness is required." The caveat about the additional witness ap-
parently refers to GA. CODE ANN. § 29-101 (1969), which provides that a deed to lands must
be "attested by at least two witnesses." In Allgood v. Allgood, 230 Ga. 312, 196 S.E.2d 888
(1976), the court held that attestation affects only recordability, so § 29-101 must be viewed
as a provision designating the number of witnesses necessary for valid recordation, although
curiously it is completely separate from the recording provisions. When § 29-405 speaks of
attestation or acknowledgment "as hereinafter provided," however, it does not seem to refer
to § 29-101, which comes before, not after § 29-405. The "hereinafter" phrase of the section
therefore must refer to GA. CODE ANN. § 29-406 (1969), which permits certain officers, in-
cluding a notary public, to attest instruments, and to GA. CODE ANN. § 29-408 (1969), which
authorizes recordation of instruments acknowledged before officers specified in § 29-406.
See also GA. CODE ANN. § 29-410 (1969) (allowing form of proof by subscribing witnesses).
The aggregate meaning of the provisions seems to be that all instruments must be attested
by two witnesses to be recordable; moreover, instruments must be either attested by or
acknowledged in the presence of an officer designated in § 29-406, or proved in the manner
set out in § 29-410. A deed with two witnesses, neither of whom is a § 29-410 officer, which
also is acknowledged before such an officer, can be recorded. A deed with two attesting
witnesses, one of whom is an officer designated in § 29-410, also can be recorded. A deed
that is acknowledged but not attested is not recordable because § 29-101, requiring two
witnesses, has not been complied with, and even a deed with an acknowledgment plus one
witness lacks the proper formality for recordation. See White & Co. v. Magarahan, 87 Ga.
217, 13 S.E. 509 (1891). See generally G. PINDAR, GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 19-56, -60 (1971).
Other statutes prescribing recordation formality different from the usual acknowledge-
or-proof model include N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:7 (1968) (attestation and acknowledg-
ment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.01 (Page 1970) (acknowledgment in presence of two
attesting witnesses, who shall attest by signing and subscribe names to attestation); and VT.
STAT. ANN. §§ 341-342 (1975) (attestation by two witnesses plus acknowledgment).
Finally, in a number of states if neither acknowledgment nor proof by subscribing wit-
nesses is possible, other kinds of proof will suffice to allow recordation of an instrument.
E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1198-1204 (West 1954) (execution established by proof of handwrit-
ing of party and of subscribing witness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 18-4-19, -20 (1979)
(same).
57. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-3-1 (1972) (instrument shall not be admitted to record un-
less execution acknowledged or proved, and instrument admitted without acknowledgment
or proof "shall not be notice to creditors or subsequent purchasers for valuable considera-
tion"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-8-4 (instrument not "acknowledged and certified may not be
filed and recorded, nor considered of record, though so entered"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 26 (West 1951) (no instrument shall be recorded unless acknowledged; recording of unac-
knowledged instrument "shall not be effective for any purpose").
58. Smalley v. Juneau Clinic Bldg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972) (noting the
purposes of acknowledgment, "to allow an instrument to be recorded or to be introduced
into evidence without further proof of execution"); Reid v. Kleyensteuber, 7 Ariz. 58, 60 P.
879 (1900); Wyatt v. Miller, 255 Ark. 304, 500 S.W.2d 590 (1973); Henrici v. South Feather
Land & Water Co., 177 Cal. 442, 170 P. 1135 (1918); Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co., 129 Fla.
628, 177 So. 201 (1937); Gardner v. Granniss, 57 Ga. 539 (1876); Matheson v. Harris, 98
Idaho 758, 572 P.2d.861 (1977); Bledsoe v. Ross, 59 Ind. App. 609, 109 N.E. 53 (1915);
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lacking the proper formality, although physically placed in the
records, has no status as a record59 and therefore gives no construc-
tive notice of the transaction from which it arose.6 0
If a physically recorded instrument lacking proper formality
does not give constructive notice, the instrument's validity as
against certain categories of third persons is seriously jeopardized.
At common law, the general rule was that the property interest
created first had priority; when the transferor purported to convey
a later interest, he or she had nothing left to convey.61 Most Amer-
ican recording statutes, however, operate to protect subsequent
purchasers who take without notice of an earlier transaction.62
Thus, it is in a transferee's interest to make sure no later purchas-
ers can take without notice. The easiest way to ensure this result is
to record the conveyance because a validly recorded conveyance
gives a kind of constructive notice that is usually referred to as
record notice.63 Whether a subsequent transferee actually looks in
the real estate records is immaterial; he or she is held to have no-
tice merely because the conveyance is recorded. 64 Inasmuch as a
physically recorded instrument lacking prescribed formality is de-
nied effect as constructive notice, a subsequent purchaser will take
free of the earlier interest unless it can be established that the pur-
chaser acquired notice in some other way.65
Dussaume v. Burnett, 5 Iowa 95 (1857); Nordman v. Rau, 86 Kan. 19, 119 P. 351 (1911);
Ferrell v. Childress, 172 Ky. 760, 189 S.W. 1149 (1916); DeWitt v. Loulton, 17 Me. 418
(1840); Graves v. Graves, 72 Mass. 391 (1856); Hatcher v. Hall, 292 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App.
1956); Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N.H. 481
(1852); New Jersey Bank v. Azco Realty Co., 148 N.J. Super. 159, 372 A.2d 356 (1977);
Vorenburg v. Bosserman, 17 N.M. 433, 130 P. 438 (1913); High v. Davis, 283 Or. 315, 584
P.2d 725 (1978); McKean & Elk Land Improvement Co. v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. 269 (1860); Ban-
bury v. Sherin, 4 S.D. 88, 55 N.W. 723 (1893); Childers v. William H. Coleman Co., 122
Tenn. 109, 118 S.W. 1018 (1909); Tandy v. Dickinson, 371 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963);
Norton v. Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926); Pope v. Henry, 24 Vt. 560 (1852); Hunton v.
Wood, 101 Va. 54, 43 S.E. 186 (1903); Abney v. Ohio Lumber & Mining Co., 45 W. Va. 446,
32 S.E. 256 (1898); Thomas v. Roth, 386 P.2d 926 (Wyo. 1963).
59. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.31, at 616 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
60. In a few states formal requirements exist for recordation, but noncomplying in-
struments that actually reach the records are given effect as constructive notice. See notes
93-94 & accompanying text infra.
61. J. CRmBEgr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 279 (2d ed. 1975).
62. Id. at 279-80.
63. Id. at 289.
64. Id.
65. Possession, for example, can constitute inquiry notice. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 17.12 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
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If a prospective purchaser searches the real estate records and
discovers an earlier conveyance lacking the formality required for
valid recording, the question arises whether the subsequent pur-
chaser is charged with actual notice of the earlier interest and
must take subject to it. Among the jurisdictions that have consid-
ered this problem, the nearly unanimous view is that the subse-
quent purchaser does take subject to the interest created by the
nonconforming instrument.6 In Hastings v. Cutler,6 7 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court stated:
As the deed in this case was not executed according to the stat-
ute, the registration as such is inoperative; that is to say, the re-
gistration is not constructive notice of the conveyance. But if by
means of that registration of the defective deed, the defendants
had actual notice of the plaintiff's title, they are charged with the
notice as in other cases. The defendants, when they found the
copy of the plaintiff's deed on record, must have understood that
the intended record was to give information that such a deed had
been made, and that the plaintiff claimed the land under it. This
must be regarded as actual notice, such as every reasonable and
honest man would feel bound to act upon.68
Once a court concludes that discovery of an informal docu-
ment in the records amounts to actual notice, logically it also must
decide how to allocate the evidentiary burdens on the factual ques-
tion of whether the subsequent transferee did see the record copy
of the defectively formalized instrument. Although this problem is
rarely discussed in the cases, several approaches to it are conceiva-
ble. The court might create a conclusive presumption that the sub-
sequent taker saw the record copy of the earlier conveyance. Such
66. See Prince v. Alford, 173 Ark. 633, 293 S.W. 36 (1927); Parkside Realty Co. v.
MacDonald, 166 Cal. 426, 137 P. 21 (1913); Lassiter v. Curtiss-Bright Co., 129 Fla. 728, 177
So. 201 (1937); Walters v. Hartwig, 106 Ind. 123, 6 N.E. 5 (1886); Saunders v. King, 119
Iowa 291, 93 N.W. 272 (1903); Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894); Musick v.
Barney, 49 Mo. 458 (1872); Mulligan v. Snavely, 117 Neb. 765, 223 N.W. 8 (1929); High v.
Davis, 283 Or. 315, 584 P.2d 725 (1978); Farmers Mut. Royalty Syndicate, Inc. v. Isaaks, 138
S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Vermont Mining & Quarrying Co. v. Windham County
Bank, 44 Vt. 489 (1872). See also Gardner v. Granniss, 57 Ga. 539 (1876); Aiau v. Kupau, 4
Haw. 384 (1881); Farm Bureau Fin. Co., Inc. v. Carney, 605 P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980); Ferrell v.
Childress, 172 Ky. 760, 189 S.W. 1149 (1916); Baker v. Baker, 90 N.M. 38, 559 P.2d 415
(1977); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Boiteau, 376 A.2d 323 (R.I. 1977); Stockton
v. Murray, 25 Tenn. App. 371, 157 S.W.2d 859 (1942); Hunton v. Wood, 101 Va. 54, 43 S.E.
186 (1903); Clarksburg Casket Co. v. Valley Undertaking Co., 81 W. Va. 212, 94 S.E. 549
(1917).
67. 24 N.H. 481 (1852).
68. Id. at 483.
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a conclusive presumption could be defended on the same grounds
that might be used to explain the record notice given by a validly
recorded conveyance: It is the policy of the recording acts that a
prospective transferee make a reasonable title search; therefore, a
transferee is charged with notice of whatever a reasonable title
search would reveal. The transparent weakness in such a presump-
tion is that it renders impotent the legislatively mandated formal
requirements for valid recordation because a conclusive presump-
tion of actual notice would not differ practically from the record
notice reserved for validly recorded instruments.69
An alternative evidentiary standard would be to create a re-
buttable presumption that a subsequent transferee actually saw a
prior unacknowledged, unwitnessed conveyance in the records dur-
ing a title search. This burden would force a transferee who sought
to take free of the earlier interest to introduce evidence that the
routine title search was not made or was made imprudently with
the result that the earlier conveyance was not discovered.70 The
rebuttable presumption alternative, however, uncomfortably re-
wards the negligent. A careless transferee who convinces a jury of
his or her carelessness in conducting a proper title search can take
free of the earlier conveyance, but a careful and honest transferee,
having found the conveyance, will take subject to it or, more likely,
withdraw from the transaction.
A third evidentiary alternative would be to treat the fact of
physical recordation as some evidence for the trier of fact on the
question of actual notice. The presence of an instrument in the
records surely increases the probability that the subsequent trans-
69. See Bell v. Sage, 60 Cal. App. 149, 212 P. 404 (1922).
70. Cf. Scult v. Bergen Valley Builders, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 124, 135-36, 183 A.2d 865,
871 (1962), af'd, 82 N.J. Super. 124, 197 A.2d 704 (1964) (discussing inquiry notice from
validly recorded materials: "I feel that in the absence of knowledge of any kind concerning
the property to be purchased it would be inequitable to automatically and unhesitatingly
decide that every prospective purchaser is irrebuttably charged with knowledge of the facts
contained in the record together with such facts as a reasonable inquiry might uncover. A
more equitable solution is to create a rebuttable presumption that a party has searched the
record and discovered facts contained therein which put him on inquiry to pursue his search
further. When the party against whom the presumption operates introduces evidence which
establishes that he did not in fact search the record-as is the inevitable case where a per-
son has only reached the stage of signing a contract to purchase real estate-the presump-
tion disappears and he is chargeable only with notice of the facts contained in the record
altogether with such facts as he actually knows. Proof may then be introduced by the oppos-
ing party to establish that a search was made.").
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feree saw it.7 1 Accordingly, most courts probably would not adopt
the final possible alternative of counting physical recordation as
not admissible at all on the issue of actual notice.
A few states go beyond the constructive notice rules to circum-
scribe the validity of a defectively formalized deed against third
parties. In Kansas, for example, one who sees the physically re-
corded copy of an unacknowledged deed is not charged with actual
notice of the transaction from which the deed arose and therefore
may ignore the copy. In Nordman v. Rau,7 2 Rau gave Nordman a
mortgage on his land. A copy of the mortgage instrument was re-
corded without any acknowledgment. Rau's land subsequently was
sold by the sheriff to Webb to satisfy a personal judgment against
Rau. The trial court found that Webb's lawyer had discovered the
record of the mortgage before bidding on the land for Webb. The
Kansas Supreme Court held that Webb took Rau's land free of the
Nordman mortgage even though the lawyer's knowledge was fully
imputable to Webb:
One who has seen the record of an unacknowledged instrument is
not deemed, because of that fact, to have actual notice of the in-
strument itself, upon these grounds: To charge him with such
notice is to require him to assume, without proof and without
competent evidence, that a valid conveyance is in existence corre-
sponding to the unauthorized copy .... To charge him with ac-
tual notice of the existence of a conveyance, because he has seen a
copy of it which, without legal authority, has been written in a
book of public records, is essentially to give such copy the force of
a valid record. To hold that the record of an unacknowledged
conveyance, if known to a prospective buyer, amounts to actual
notice of the instrument, is to compel him to give it force as evi-
dence, which the court itself would refuse it.7
-
The court noted, however, that Webb would have been charged
with notice of the mortgage if the lawyer had seen not the physi-
cally recorded copy, but the unacknowledged mortgage itself.7 4
Justice Mason, who delivered the opinion for the majority, also
wrote a dissent:
My own view of the question presented is this: Where a prospec-
tive buyer of land sees upon the record what purports to be the
copy of an instrument bearing no certificate of acknowledgment
71. See Prince v. Alford, 173 Ark. 633, 293 S.W. 36 (1927).
72. 86 Kan. 19, 119 P. 351 (1911).
73. Id. at 22, 119 P. at 352-53.
74. Id. at 23, 119 P. at 353.
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(or a defective one, for the rule would necessarily be the same),
the inference which he would naturally and almost necessarily
draw would be that the record was made at the instance of the
grantee; and that the grantee claimed to have an interest in the
land under an instrument in the language of the copy. The record
would not be competent legal evidence that such an instrument
had been executed, but it would suggest that probability so
strongly that a prudent person having knowledge of it would be
put upon inquiry. It would give him a definite and tangible clue
which, if diligently followed up, would ordinarily bring the truth
of the matter to light. In the present case, if an inquiry had been
prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the existence of the mort-
gage would necessarily have been developed.
75
Oklahoma apparently also would allow a subsequent purchaser
to take free of a defectively formalized conveyance even if the pur-
chaser has seen a physically recorded copy of the conveyance. In
New York, the validity of an unacknowledged, unwitnessed deed as
against third persons also is uncertain. A statute provides:
A grant in fee or of a freehold estate, must be subscribed by
the person from whom the estate or interest conveyed is intended
to pass, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. If
not duly acknowledged before its delivery, according to the provi-
sions of this chapter, its execution and delivery must be attested
by at least one witness, or, if not so attested, it does not take
effect as against a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer until so
acknowledged.
77
The New York courts have interpreted the statute to mean that a
defectively formalized instrument is ineffective against a subse-
quent purchaser or incumbrancer even if the subsequent transferee
knows of the instrument itself. 8 The New York Court of Appeals,
in an opinion by Judge Cardozo,' somewhat limited the scope of
the statute,80 but the provision apparently remains a significant
75. Id. at 23-24, 119 P. at 353 (Mason, J., dissenting).
76. See Smith v. Thompson, 402 P.2d 882 (Okla. 1965). See also 20 OKLA. L. REV. 83
(1967) (advocating that an actual viewing of a defectively acknowledged instrument in
records should be at least inquiry notice and suggests that Smith is ambiguous enough on
the point to allow court now to adopt this position).
77. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 243 (McKinney 1968).
78. Nells v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 15 N.E. 739 (1888); Dunn v. Dunn, 151 A.D. 800,
136 N.Y.S. 282 (1912).
79. City of New York v. New York & S. Brooklyn Steam Transp. Co., 231 N.Y. 18, 131
N.E. 554 (1921).
80. The court held that Nellis decided only the effect of notice when restricted to the
deed: "The question is distinctly reserved in Nellis v. Munson ... whether different effect
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threat to the third-party validity of defectively formalized convey-
ances in New York.
Arkansas"' and Hawaii8 2 endorse the majority view, requiring
subsequent purchasers having actual knowledge of defectively for-
malized but physically recorded instruments to take subject to the
prior conveyances. 8 Both states treat mortgages differently, how-
ever, allowing subsequent transferees who have actual knowledge
to take free of prior conveyances.8 4
Finally, in a number of states, compliance with prescribed for-
mality has little or nothing to do with the validity of a conveyance
against third parties. Statutes in Colorado 8 and Illinois 8  have
been interpreted to mean that unacknowledged, unwitnessed in-
struments are fully eligible for recording.8 7 The Alabama recording
officials must accept for recording any "[document] purporting to
convey [an] interest in any real estate" that has been "executed in
accordance with law . ... "88 In Niehuss v. Ford,9 an Alabama
court held that an unacknowledged, unattested conveyance signed
by the grantor and delivered to the grantee, may be recorded
under the statute; although such an instrument conveys no legal
interest,90 it does operate to convey an equitable interest91 and
therefore fits the description of a recordable document. Connecti-
cut accomplishes the Niehuss result by statute.92 Michigan, Min-
nesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin distinguish between an in-
strument's eligibility for recording and its status if it actually
may not be given to notice of extrinsic equities. That question is now here. Possession and
improvements are effective against subsequent purchasers if the possessor of the land is
there without a deed. We find it inconceivable that they should be ineffective, in like cir-
cumstances of notice, when he is there with an imperfect deed." Id. at 26, 131 N.E. at 557.
81. See Prince v. Afford, 173 Ark. 633, 293 S.W. 36 (1927).
82. See Aiau v. Kupau, 4 Haw. 384 (1881).
83. See notes 66-68 & accompanying text supra.
84. See Wright v. Graham, 42 Ark. 140 (1883); Lalakea v. Hilo Sugar Co., 15 Haw. 570
(1904).
85. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-106 (1973) (unacknowledged deed which has remained of
record for ten years deemed to have been properly acknowledged).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 30 (Smith-Hurd 1969) (unacknowledged conveyances
deemed from time of being filed for record to constitute notice).
87. See Montague & Co. v. Aygarn, 164 IM. App. 596 (1911); 1 E. KING, COLORADO
PRACTICE 195 (1970).
88. ALA. CODE § 35-4-51 (1975).
89. 251 Ala. 529, 38 So. 2d 484 (1949).
90. See notes 37-39 & accompanying text supra.
91. See note 39 & accompanying text supra.
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-17 (West 1978).
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reaches the real estate records. In these states if an "ineligible"93
instrument actually is placed in the records, the instrument is




Section 2-301 of the USLTA provides that "no. . . acknowl-
edgment, seal, or witness is required for a document to be eligible
for recording."9 Thus, under the USLTA a physically recorded
conveyance lacking pre-USLTA formality is a legally recorded con-




Even if state legislatures abolished the property rules that re-
quire acknowledgments and kindred formalities, a well-counseled
transferee still would insist not only that the transferor and a no-
tary complete the acknowledgment ritual, but also that at least the
more recent 97 conveyances in the transferor's recorded chain of
title98 bear regular acknowledgment certificates or equivalent for-
malities. Such an insistence on formality would be based on the
evidentiary significance of the notary's certificate. If a transferee's
93. The four states continue to impose statutory formality for recording. MxcH. COMp.
LAws ANN. § 565.23 (1967) (certificate of acknowledgment or proof of execution); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 507.24 (West Supp. 1979) (certificate of acknowledgment); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-19-03 (1978) (acknowledgment or proof); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.05 (West Special Pam-
phlet 1980) (acknowledgment). A Minnesota statute prohibits a recorder from recording an
unacknowledged instrument and prescribes criminal and civil penalties for recorders who
violate the section. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 386.39 (West Supp. 1979). See Brown v. Mc-
Cormack, 28 Mich. 215, 221 (1873) (registers required to abstain from recording defective
papers).
94. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 565.604 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.24 (West Supp.
1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.05(7) (West Special Pam-
phlet 1980). The North Dakota statute may have been prompted by Crum, Five Steps
Toward Sounder Record Title, 32 N.D.L. Rav. 223, 232 (1956).
95. USLTA § 2-301(b).
96. Under the principal priority provision of USLTA the claim of a purchaser for
value who has recorded his or her conveyance is subordinated to an "adverse claim that is
... created or evidenced by a document recorded before the conveyance to the purchaser is
recorded. . . ." USLTA § 3-202(a)(1).
97. See note 114 & accompanying text infra.
98. See notes 182-83 & accompanying text infra.
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ownership claim is challenged, the transferee will want to show the
jury both the deed from the transferor and the other recorded
links in the chain of title. If, however, either the transferee's con-
veyance, whether the original or a recorded copy, or another link in
the chain of title lacks an acknowledgment certificate or the like,
there is a risk that a court would disallow altogether introduction
of the instrument into evidence. Conversely, the presence of an ac-
knowledgment certificate on a conveyance may result in both the
instrument's admission into evidence and the shifting of the bur-
den to the transferee's challenger to disprove the genuineness of
the conveyance by clear and convincing evidence.
•Admissibility
Although the purpose of the recording statutes is to protect
subsequent purchasers, 9 recording schemes fulfill at least one
other function-to enable a property owner to demonstrate title by
producing recorded copies of the chain of written conveyances end-
ing with the conveyance to the owner. 100 The early courts under-
stood the evidentiary purpose of the recording acts," 1 but still
were reluctant in some cases to admit in evidence recorded copies
of conveyances. The courts reasoned that the fact that a convey-
ance had been copied into the public land records gave no assur-
ance in itself that the original instrument was genuine.10 2 Thus, the
rule evolved that a recorded copy of an instrument could be intro-
duced in evidence if the recording scheme required the official cus-
todian of the records to ensure the authenticity of a conveyance
before recording it.10 3 This rule linking admissibility of a record to
a recordkeeper's official duty to check for authenticity was based
on the assumption that the recorded copy need pass some initial
test of genuineness as a prerequisite for admission before the jury.
That assumption can be traced to the common law evidentiary rule
of "authentication. 10 4 Under this rule, "the purported signature or
recital of authorship on the face of a writing will not be accepted
99. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
100. See P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 11 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
BASYE].
101. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1648, at 721 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
102. Id. at 720.
103. Id. at 724.




as sufficient preliminary proof of authenticity to secure the admis-
sion of the writing in evidence. ' 105 The courts regarded the
recordkeeper's public duty to check for genuineness as the suffi-
cient preliminary evidence of authenticity demanded by the
rule. e10 On the same principle, the courts also admitted recorded
copies of instruments if the particular recording scheme required
that conveyances be acknowledged or proved as a prerequisite for
recording, although the scheme did not obligate the recordkeeper
to check for genuineness.10 7 The notary was regarded as a sur-
rogate for the recordkeeper in performing the authentication
function.10
The judicial approach to determining the admissibility of re-
corded copies of conveyances has influenced legislation in the area.
Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes specifically allowing re-
corded copies of instruments to be admitted in evidence,09 but be-
cause most recording statutes require a certificate of acknowledg-
ment or proof as a prerequisite for proper recording," 0 the effect is
the same as the judicially developed rule.""
The absence of a certificate of acknowledgment or proof,
105. Id. § 218, at 544 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. § 224.
107. 5 J. WIGMORS, EVIDENCE § 1648, at 724 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 1651, at 731 n.4 (statutes collected).
110. See notes 56-60 & accompanying text supra.
111. "An instrument, even though recorded, may be improperly executed or acknowl-
edged and therefore inadmissible in evidence notwithstanding the fact that it may have
constituted an effective conveyance as between the parties." BAsYE, supra note 100, § 11, at
76 (footnote omitted). Even in states where a recorded conveyance gives constructive notice
despite noncompliance with statutorily prescribed formality, see notes 85-94 & accompany-
ing text supra, the recorded conveyance may need a certificate of acknowledgment or proof
to gain admission into evidence. For example, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 30 (Smith-Hurd
1969) states: "Deeds, mortgages and other instruments of writing relating to real estate
shall be deemed, from the time of being filed for the record, notice to subsequent purchasers
and creditors, though not acknowledged or proven according to law; but the same shall not
be read in evidence, unless their execution be proved in manner required by the rules of
evidence applicable to such writings, so as to supply the defects of such acknowledgement or
proof."
Thus far this analysis has not touched on the case of the unrecorded, original convey-
ance. The common law was reluctant to treat even an acknowledged original as sufficiently
trustworthy to be shown to the jury, the institution of the notary not having caught on in
England as it had on the continent. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1676 (Chadbourn rev.
1974). In the United States, however, many states have enacted legislation making acknowl-
edged or proved instruments admissible whether or not the instruments have been recorded.
Id. at 846 n.9 (statutes collected). Contra, Din.. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 155 (1974) (no acknowl-
edgment or proof shall make deed evidence unless duly recorded).
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therefore, can be a significant threat to an instrument's admissibil-
ity in evidence, because the notarially deficient instrument is sub-
ject to the full rigor of the authentication requirement. The no-
tary's certificate is not the exclusive means, however, of providing
sufficient preliminary evidence of authenticity. Witnesses to the
conveyance can be called,112 if they can be found.1" If the convey-
ance is old enough, it can be admitted as an "ancient" docu-
ment.1 14 The virtue of the certificate of acknowledgment or proof is
that it obviates the necessity of relying on these other means of
authentication.
Presumption of Genuineness
In most states the certificate of acknowledgment or proof not
only ensures a conveyance's admissibility in evidence; it also
triggers a presumption in favor of the genuineness of the instru-
ment.115 The strength of the presumption varies. Under one formu-
112. MCCORMICK, supra note 104, § 219.
113. Regarding the limitations of such proof, see BASYE, supra note 100, § 12, at 77.
114. "A writing which has been in existence for a number of years will frequently be
difficult to authenticate by direct evidence. Where the maker of an instrument, those who
witnessed the making, and even those familiar with the maker's handwriting have over the
course of years died or become unavailable, the need to resort to authentication by circum-
stantial evidence is apparent. The circumstances which may, in a given case, raise an in-
ference of the genuineness of an aged writing are of course quite varied, and any combina-
tion of circumstances sufficient to support a finding of genuineness will be appropriate
authentication ...
"The frequent necessity of authenticating ancient writings by circumstantial evidence
plus the consideration that certain of the above facts probative of authenticity are com-
monly found associated with genuine older writings have led the courts to develop a rule of
thumb for dealing with the question. Under this rule a writing is sufficiently authenticated
as an ancient document if the party who offers it satisfies the judge that the writing is thirty
years old, that it is unsuspicious in appearance, and further proves that the writing is pro-
duced from a place of custody natural for such a document. In addition to the foregoing
requirements, some jurisdictions, if the writing is a dispositive one such as a deed or a will,
impose the additional condition that possession must have been taken under the instrument
." McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 223 (footnotes omitted).
115. See Jordan v. Conservation & Land Co., 273 Ala. 99, 134 So. 2d 777 (1961) (per-
son attacking acknowledged, recorded deed as forgery must show forgery by clear and con-
vincing evidence, reaching high degree of certainty, leaving upon the mind no fair, just
doubts of truthfulness of fact); Huskins v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 394 P.2d 668
(Alaska 1964) (proper acknowledgment creates presumption of genuineness that can be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence showing deed was a forgery); Lynn v. Quil-
len, 178 Ark. 1150, 13 S.W.2d 264 (1929) (one attacking genuineness of signature on deed
properly acknowledged and recorded must show by preponderance of evidence that deed
was not in fact signed); Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 205 P.2d 495 (1949) (where forgery of
deed alleged, acknowledgment of signature on deed not impeached by notary's testimony
lation the factfinder must accept the authenticity of the acknowl-
edged conveyance if no contrary evidence is offered, but may treat
that signature might have been forged); McReynolds v. Stoats, 288 Ill. 22, 122 N.E. 860
(1919) (presumption of execution arising from notary's certificate can be overcome only by
clear proof); McMurray v. Crawford, 3 Kan. App. 2d 329, 594 P.2d 1109 (1979) (direct evi-
dence of forgery and nonexecution not sufficient to overcome presumption of execution cre-
ated by certificate of acknowledgment, which presumption may-be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence); Hoagland v. Fish, 238 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1951) (certificate of ac-
knowledgment can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that deed was for-
gery); Hall v. Hall, 190 Mich. 100, 155 N.W. 695 (1916) (certificate in proper form impeacha-
ble only by clear, convincing, satisfactory proof of nonexecution); Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d
410 (Miss. 1969) (presumption of genuineness of properly acknowledged deed can be over-
come only by clear, strong, and convincing evidence of forgery); Springhorn v. Springer, 75
Mont. 294, 243 P. 803 (1926) (certificate of acknowledgment makes prima facie case of genu-
ineness as strong as if witness had sworn to facts in open court); Kucaba v. Kucaba, 146
Neb. 116, 18 N.W.2d 645 (1945) (acknowledged deed will not be set aside as forgery absent
clear and convincing evidence); Dancer v. Erb, 142 N.J. Eq. 422, 60 A.2d 282 (1948) (state-
ments contained in acknowledgment may be shown untrue, but to overcome strong pre-
sumption of integrity, proof must be clear, satisfactory, and convincing); Gutierrez v. Gi-
anini, 64 N.M. 64, 323 P.2d 1102 (1958) (acknowledged instruments may be set aside as
forgery only on clear and convincing evidence); Albany County Sav. Bank v. McCarty, 149
N.Y. 71, 43 N.E. 427 (1896) (between parties, certificate of acknowledgment makes a case as
strong as if the facts certified had been duly sworn in open court by witness apparently
disinterested and worthy of belief); Klundt v. Pfeifle, 77 N.D. 132, 41 N.W.2d 416 (1950)
(nonexecution of acknowledged instrument must be shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence); Weaver v. Crommes, 109 Ohio App. 470, 167 N.E.2d 661 (1959) (presumption of
validity of grantor's signature on properly formalized instrument can be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence); Bauder v. Bauder, 195 Okla. 85, 155 P.2d 543 (1945) (gen-
eral rule is that acknowledged deed will be declared a forgery only on clear and convincing
evidence, but if it appears grantor did not appear before notary, evidentiary force of ac-
knowledgment is destroyed or greatly lessened); Pusic v. Salak, 261 Pa. 512, 104 A. 751
(1918) (where acknowledged deed is attacked as fraudulent, evidence must be clear and
satisfactory); Abram v. Southeastern Fund, 404 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (filing of
affidavit of forgery does not constitute proof thereof; before submitting issue of genuineness
to jury a court must find that proof is clear and unmistakable); Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952) (instrument bearing certificate of
acknowledgment will be set aside as forgery on clear and convincing evidence); Burson v.
Andes, 83 Va. 445, 8 S.E. 249 (1887) (in the absence of fraud, certificate of notary is conclu-
sive evidence of facts stated therein and required by statute); Lohnes v. Meenk Lumber Co.,
18 Wash. 2d 251, 138 P.2d 885 (1943) (validity of certificate of acknowledgment cannot be
successfully challenged by unsupported testimony of grantors, but corroborated testimony
that is clear, cogent, and convincing may be enough to overcome the presumption); Roberts
v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 89 W. Va. 384, 109 S.E. 348 (1921) (acknowledged deed will
be set aside as forgery only on evidence that is clear, cogent, satisfactory, and convincing
beyond reasonable doubt or controversy); Linde v. Gudden, 109 Wis. 326, 85 N.W. 323
(1901) (nonexecution of acknowledged deed can be proved only by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence; defense of nonexecution of deed must be established "beyond all rea-
sonable controversy"); Rowray v. Casper Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 48 Wyo. 290, 45 P.2d 7
(1935) (allegation that grantor did not sign or acknowledge signature must be shown by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence).
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the instrument as any other evidence-that is, vulnerable to the
jury's acceptance or rejection-once contrary evidence is intro-
duced.116 A somewhat stronger formulation shifts the burden of
persuasion by requiring the challenger of the acknowledged instru-
ment to show by a preponderance of the evidence the conveyance's
inauthenticity. 117 The strongest and most widely accepted formula-
tion requires the opponent of an acknowledged or proved instru-
ment to show by the more rigorous standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence 1 8 that the instrument is not authentic.1 9
116. See Dempsey v. Allen, 210 Minn. 395, 298 N.W. 570 (1941); Springhorn v.
Springer, 75 Mont. 294, 243 P. 803 (1926); Albany County Sav. Bank v. McCarty, 149 N.Y.
71, 43 N.E. 427 (1896).
117. See Lynn v. Quillen, 178 Ark. 1150, 13 S.W.2d 624 (1929); Taylor v. Claybrook,
171 Ark. 1189, 288 S.W. 720 (1926).
118. See Jordan v. Conservation & Land Co., 273 Ala. 99, 134 So. 2d 777 (1961); Hus-
kins v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 394 P.2d 668 (Alaska 1964); McReynolds v. Stoats, 288
IlM. 22, 122 N.E. 860 (1919); McMurray v. Crawford, 3 Kan. App. 2d 329, 594 P.2d 1109
(1979); Hoagland v. Fish, 238 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1951); Hall v. Hall, 190 Mich. 100, 155 N.W.
695 (1916); Arnold v. Byrd, 222 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1969); Kucaba v. Kucaba, 146 Neb. 116, 18
N.W.2d 645 (1945); Gutierrez v. Gianini, 64 N.M. 64, 323 P.2d 1102 (1958); Klundt v.
Pfeifle, 77 N.D. 132, 41 N.W.2d 416 (1950); Weaver v. Crommes, 109 Ohio App. 470, 167
N.E.2d 661 (1959); Bauder v. Bauder, 195 Okla. 85, 155 P.2d 543 (1945); Pusic v. Salak, 261
Pa. 512, 104 A. 751 (1918); Abram v. Southeastern Fund, 404 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966); Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952);
Roberts v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 89 W. Va. 384, 109 S.E. 348 (1921); Linde v. Gud-
den, 109 Wis. 326, 85 N.W. 323 (1901); Rowray v. Casper Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 48 Wyo.
290, 45 P.2d 7 (1935).
119. The need to give security to land titles underlies the judicial willingness to accord
an acknowledged conveyance a strong presumption of genuineness: "Are these facts and
circumstances and the testimony of these witnesses sufficient to overthrow and brand as a
forgery a solemn deed or instrument, twenty-five years after it purports to have been exe-
cuted before a public officer? If so, there is little safety in the titles to land. The treachery of
memories, and the cupidity and avarice of former owners and claimants of the land would
be sufficient to overthrow deeds and other instruments." Roberts v. Huntington Dev. & Gas
Co., 89 W. Va. 384, 391, 109 S.E. 348, 351 (1921).
In a case decided before the advent of photocopied conveyancing records, one court
declined to apply the clear and convincing evidence presumption to an acknowledged, re-
corded copy of a deed because the acknowledgment itself might be used in furtherance of
fraud: "The common-law rule requiring that there must be strong, clear, and convincing
testimony to overcome the recitals of the certificate of acknowledgment ... grew up with
... the... rule requiring the party offering a deed to produce the original instrument and
prove its due execution, and when the statute of this state abrogated the common-law rule
requiring the production of the original instrument and proof of its execution, and substi-
tuted in place thereof a recorded copy, without proof of execution, some of the reasons for
the rule requiring such strong, clear, and convincing evidence to overcome the recitals of the
certificate of acknowledgment ceased to exist .... The object of [the statute] was to render
more secure recorded real estate titles, but in the instance of forged deeds, especially where
the forgery is not discovered until after many years, it may also furnish a convenient




Section 2-305 of the USLTA accords a number of evidentiary
presumptions to a "recorded signed document, ' 120 including a pre-
sumption that "the document is genuine and was executed as the
voluntary act of the. person purporting to execute it ... ."I'l The
term "presumption" as used in section 2-305 "means that the
party against whom the presumption is directed has the burden of
proving that the non-existence of the presumed fact is more prob-
able than its existence.1 1 22 One author has offered the view that
section 2-305 "does not make any drastic departures from existing
state law, statutory or decisional"1 28 primarily because "[sitatutes
in a number of states have the effect of providing that the record-
ing of a conveyance is evidence of due execution ... ."I"" The full
significance of section 2-305, however, becomes apparent when the
section is read in conjunction with section 2-301, which provides
that an unacknowledged, unwitnessed conveyance is entitled to
recordation.125 The two sections together suggest that a signed con-
veyance lacking any other formality can be recorded and that,
when recorded, it becomes the beneficiary of strong evidentiary
presumptions. Such treatment of unacknowledged, unproved in-
might, under this statute, place the same on record, then burn or otherwise destroy the
original forged instrument, keep quiet for many years until a time when it is exceedingly
difficult for the true owner of the land to prove the surrounding circumstances, and then go
into court and rely on the recitals in the recorded copy of the certificate of acknowledgment
to the forged instrument, and the true owner of the land could have no other testimony than
his own oath, and which, we are of the opinion, might be amply sufficient to justify a finding
in his favor by the jury or trial court. . . . Under the rule requiring the production of the
original instrument, the signature of the grantor, and also the signature of the notary who
signed the certificate, would be in evidence, and the real owner of the land might, in many
cases, be able to show by numerous witnesses that the purported signature to the forged
instrument was not in his handwriting, and might also be able to show by evidence of that
character that the signature of the notary to the certificate of acknowledgment was also a
forgery . . . . Under these circumstances the strict rule in regard to the sacredness of the
certificate of acknowledgment should be relaxed." Vesey v. Solberg, 27 S.D. 618, 621-22, 132
N.W. 254, 255-56 (1911). Presumably the Vesey court would have been less concerned about
the strength of the presumption of genuineness if the record of the deed had consisted of a
picture of the original, showing the grantor's signature.
120. USLTA § 2-305(a).
121. Id. § 2-305(a)(1).
122. Id. § 1-201(13) (emphasis added).
123. Comment, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Areas of De-
parture from State Law, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 359, 375 (1978).
124. Id. at 374.
125. See notes 95-96 & accompanying text supra.
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struments contravenes current law. The statutes cited by the com-
mentator 128 allow properly recorded copies of conveyances into ev-
idence, and under current law a conveyance is properly recorded
only if it adheres to prescribed formality-usually a certificate of
acknowledgment or proof.127 Moreover, the link between a notary's
certificate and the admissibility of a physically recorded copy of an
instrument transcends coincidence. The existing statutes must be
read against the judicially evolved rule that a recorded copy is ad-
missible without further proof only if the particular recording
scheme includes a requirement that an official verify the genuine-
ness of the offered instrument.1 2 Thus, the USLTA sections 2-301
and 2-305, which together abandon the logic of the current statutes
and the judicial rule that preceded the statutes, should be viewed
as substantial alterations of existing law.
Curative Legislation
The possibility of error is inherent in any human activity.
The conveyancer's art is no exception. Because of the frequency
with which land has been transferred in this country, and because
some of the many persons who have engaged in the conveyancer's
art of drafting deeds and other legal instruments affecting land
titles have lacked sufficient skill, it is inevitable that conveyances
and instruments should repeatedly be found ineffective for their
intended purpose. Our land records are full of such
instruments. 12 9
Instruments lacking proper acknowledgments or analogous
formalities might be ineffective as between the parties 30 or as
against some third persons,'31 and might not be admissible in evi-
dence,13 2 much less entitled to any presumption of genuineness."s'
The potentially disastrous consequences associated with the neg-
lect of the formalities nonetheless would not be a great source of
concern if virtually all real estate transactions included execution
of the appropriate formalities. As Professor Basye points out, how-
126. Comment, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Areas of De-
parture from State Law, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 359, 374 n.100 (1978).
127. See notes 101-11 & accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 103-08 & accompanying text supra.
129. BASYE, supra note 100, § 202, at 464.
130. See notes 28-53 & accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 56-94 & accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 97-114 & accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 115-19 & accompanying text supra.
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ever, a great number of defective instruments have entered the
records. Notwithstanding their existence, it would be unrealistic to
suppose that many of those instruments were produced by fraudu-
lent schemes. The bulk of the defective instruments surely were
created in transactions intended by the parties to have full legal
effect. Moreover, such conveyances are links in chains of title that
support legitimate interests deserving protection.
The state legislatures have been sensitive to the frequency of
the transfers of real property by formally defective conveyances.
Many have enacted provisions termed "curative legislation"134 lit-
erally to cure defects in recorded conveyances. There is little uni-
formity in the various statutes, and many jurisdictions have chosen
not to adopt serious curative legislation at all."" Even if all of the
states were to adopt curative legislation,3 however, there would
be no comprehensive cure of the sort offered by USLTA. The cen-
tral weakness of most of the enacted curative statutes is that a
period of time must pass, 3 7 usually a very long time, before a
physically recorded instrument lacking proper formality is affected
by the statutes. During the interval between the time of the trans-
action producing the instrument and the point at which the cure is
administered, the consequences resulting from a failure to comply
with required formality may occur. 3 8
An 1868 Kansas provision curing conveyances recorded prior
to the enactment of the statute'1 9 is illustrative of the early ap-
134. For a discussion of the nature and purpose of curative legislation, see BASYE,
supra note 100, §§ 201-209.
135. "[These states] either have not admitted that mistakes are made or have con-
tended that they do not present a problem to local land titles." Id. § 202, at 465. In contrast,
a Washington court reasoned: "[G]rief and hardship. . . have been caused by the lack of
such [curative legislation]; for, under such circumstances conveyances have been very gener-
ally declared not to have imparted any notice if in any way defective .... [D]efectively
acknowledged conveyances, and even conveyances which do not purport to have been ac-
knowledged at all, frequently get of record. Some auditors receive and record any instru-
ment presented. Others, no doubt, might refuse to record a conveyance when an acknowl-
edgment is wholly lacking, but accept for record one purporting to be acknowledged,
although he believed the acknowledgment defective, thus properly giving it the benefit of
the doubt." Eggert v. Ford, 21 Wash. 2d 152, 159-60, 150 P.2d 719, 722-23 (1944).
136. Unlike Professor Basye, BAsYE, supra note 100, § 208, this author does not
include within the definition of curative legislation those statutes that altogether remove
formal requirements such as acknowledgment.
137. See notes 148-49 & accompanying text infra.
138. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2231 (1976) states: "All instruments of writing now copied
into the proper books of the office of register of deeds . . . shall, upon the passage of this
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proach to curative legislation.14 At least two practical difficulties
attend the early approach. First, if it is assumed that some uni-
form time lag should exist between the creation of a defective in-
strument and its cure,' 4' such a hiatus is not guaranteed by the
statute. A deed recorded the day before passage presumably would
be cured at passage just as would a deed recorded ten years previ-
ously. A second and more serious problem with the approach is
that no defectively formalized conveyances recorded after passage
of the act are cured. The Kansas legislature's answer to this second
problem, again illustrative of the approach taken in other states,
142
was to enact provisions virtually identical to the 1868 statute in
188714' and 1901.144 Finally, the Kansas legislature abandoned the
approach altogether and enacted a statute providing in general
-that instruments on record for a period of ten years shall impart
notice and serve as evidence of title to the same extent as properly
formalized and recorded instruments.14  This provision answers
act, be deemed to impart to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, and all other per-
sons whomsoever, notice of all... instruments, so far as, and to the extent that, the same
may be found recorded, copied or noted in said books of record, notwithstanding any defects
existing in the execution, acknowledgment, recording or certificate of recording the same;
and the record of any such instrument, or a duly authenticated copy thereof, shall be com-
petent evidence whenever ... the original is shown to be lost, or not belonging to the party
wishing to use the same, or not within his or her control: Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall be construed to affect any rights heretofore acquired in the hands of subse-
quent grantees, assignees or encumbrancers."
140. See BAsYE, supra note 100, § 208.
141. This author takes the position that no such time lag is desirable.
142. See BASYE, supra note 100, § 208.
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2235 (1976).
144. Id. § 58-2236.
145. "When any instrument ... shall have been on record in the office of the register
of deeds . . .for the period of ten (10) years, and there is a defect in such instrument
because it has not been signed by the proper officer of any corporation, or because of any
discrepancy in the corporate name, or because the corporate seal of the corporation has not
been impressed on such instrument, or because the record does not show such seal, or be-
cause such instrument is not acknowledged, or because of any defect in the execution, ac-
knowledgment, recording or certificate of recording the same, such instrument shall, from
and after the expiration of ten (10) years from the filing thereof for record, be valid as
though such instrument had, in the first instance, been in all respects duly executed, ac-
knowledged, and certified, and contained the true corporate name, and such instrument
shall, after the expiration of ten (10) years from the filing of the same for record, impart to
subsequent purchasers, encumbrancers and all other persons whomsoever, notice of such
instrument of writing so far as and to the same extent that the same may then be recorded,
copied or noted in such books of record, notwithstanding such defect.
"Such instrument or the record thereof, or a duly authenticated copy thereof, shall be
competent evidence without requiring the original to be produced or accounted for to the
same extent that written instruments, duly executed and acknowledged, or the record
[Vol. 32
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both of the criticisms of the earlier approach; a uniform ten-year
period is required for the cure of all instruments, and the statute
cures instruments recorded after the effective date of the act. In
addition, unlike statutes in some other states, it is relatively com-
prehensive. It explicitly treats both the constructive notice and the
evidentiary consequences of informality, 146 and it cures defects in
the execution, acknowledgment, recording, or certificate of record-
ing, including the complete omission of an acknowledgment.
147
The approach exemplified by the Kansas statute, despite its
clear advantages over other approaches to curative legislation, still
imposes a ten-year period during which all of the maladies that
might befall a defectively formalized conveyance might occur. The
ten-year period is not uncommon among the states; 14  in fact, some
statutes prescribe an even longer period,149 leaving little distinc-
tion-at least on the evidentiary side-between the statutes and
the common law rule allowing ancient documents into evidence.
1 5 °
Professor Basye suggests that "to delay the [curative] effect for 10
or 20 years would largely nullify the potential effect achievable by
the acts. An intervening period of two or three years would seem
reasonable and most likely to accomplish the intended cure of de-
fective documents.
'151
California legislation approaches Professor Basye's ideal. Cali-
thereof, are competent: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to
affect any rights acquired by grantees, assignees or encumbrancers subsequent to the filing
of such instrument for record and prior to the expiration of ten (10) years from the filing of
such instrument for record." Id. § 58-2237.
146. Compare id. with GA. CODE ANN. § 29-112 (1969) (essentially a codification of
common law rule allowing ancient documents into evidence; no provision whatsoever curing
constructive notice infirmity).
147. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2237 (1976) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 49-213 (1971)
(various specific defects cured), construed in Pardo v. Creamer, 228 Ark. 746, 310 S.W.2d
218 (1958) (curative statute cannot supply acknowledgment when there is none). See gener-
ally BAsYE, supra note 100, §§ 241-247.
148. See ALA. CODE § 35-4-72 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-106(2) (1974); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184, § 24 (West 1977); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 565.8 (1967); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-258 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:16 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, § 27a (West 1953); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3726 (Vernon Supp. 1979); Wyo.
STAT. § 34-109 (1977).
149. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-5-13 (1973) (20 years); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 490.340-.350
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (one year for constructive notice but 30 years for admission into evi-
dence); N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 306 (McKinney 1968) (15 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5301.07 (Page 1970) (21 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 348 (Supp. 1980) (15 years).
150. See note 114 & accompanying text supra.
151. BASYE, supra note 100, § 209, at 475.
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fornia Civil Code section 1207 states:
Any instrument affecting the title to real property, one year
after the same has been copied into the proper book of record,
. . . imparts notice of its contents to subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers, notwithstanding any defect, omission, or infor-
mality in the execution of the instrument, or in the certificate of
acknowledgment thereof, or the absence of any such certificate;
but nothing herein affects the rights of purchasers or encum-
brancers previous to the taking effect of this act. Duly certified
copies of the record of any such instrument may be read in evi-
dence with like effect as copies of an instrument duly acknowl-
edged and recorded; provided, when such copying in the proper
book of record occurred within five years prior to the trial of the
action, it is first shown that the original instrument was
genuine.152
Widespread adoption of the California provision would signifi-
cantly reduce the title insecurity produced by the rules about in-
formality, but even the California approach may be questioned. It
is unclear why even a year must pass to give a physically recorded
but unacknowledged conveyance effect as constructive notice and
at least some effect as evidence. The ultimate cure can be adminis-
tered by changing the rules that created the need for "curative"
legislation in the first place.
The Case for the USLTA Reforms
The USLTA opens the land records to conveyances lacking
notarial certificates, 153 thus ending the constructive notice in-
firmity now imposed on physically recorded, but defectively for-
malized instruments." In addition, the USLTA accords a strong
presumption of genuineness to signed, recorded instruments,155
thus discarding the current insistence on some preliminary proof of
authenticity before a defectively formalized instrument is admissi-
ble into evidence.1 56
No one has empirically quantified the harm caused by the
evidentiary infirmity and the constructive notice handicap im-
posed by the existing law. One state court, having surveyed the
152. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1207 (West 1954).
153. See notes 95-96 & accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 57-60 & accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 120-21 & accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 100-11 & accompanying text supra.
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usual sources, lamented the "grief and hardship" caused in "an as-
tounding number of ... cases" by the constructive notice infir-
mity.157 The authentication rule has been described as at best time
consuming and expensive, and at worst productive of results
"which are virtually indefensible. 1 5 8 Presumably, the "indefen-
sible results" and the "grief and hardship" refer to instances in
which applying rules of constructive notice and evidence invali-
dated transactions that the parties intended and expected to be
given full legal effect. Indeed, the empirical assumption underlying
the most powerful criticism of prescribed formality is that most
instruments lacking proper formality were generated in legitimate
transactions.159 The legislative reluctance thus far to do more than
pass curative statutes probably does not reflect rejection of this
empirical assumption, but rather indicates a belief that the bene-
fits to be derived from conveyancing formality justify the risk of
frustrating the legitimate expectations of some individuals.
Evidentiary Value
Refusing to admit an unacknowledged conveyance in evidence
without preliminary proof of authenticity suggests a presumption
that the instrument is not authentic. Such a presumption is quite
contrary to ordinary social expectations:
In the every day affairs of business and social life, it is the
custom to look merely at the writing itself for evidence as to its
source. Thus, if the writing bears a signature purporting to be
that of X, or recites that it was made by him, we assume, nothing
to the contrary appearing, that it is exactly what it purports to
be, the work of X. At this point, however, the law of evidence has
long differed from the commonsense assumption upon which each
of us conducts his own affairs, adopting instead the position that
the purported signature or recital of authorship on the face of a
writing will not be accepted as sufficient preliminary proof of au-
thenticity to secure the admission of the writing in evidence....
[W]hile traditional requirements of authentication admit-
tedly furnish some slight obstacles to the perpetration of fraud or
occurrence of mistake in the presentation of writings, it has fre-
157. Eggert v. Ford, 21 Wash. 2d 152, 159-60, 150 P.2d 719, 722-23 (1944).
158. McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 218, at 544 (footnote omitted). The cases cited in
the omitted footnote do not relate to land transfers, but were offered merely as examples;
presumably land cases might have been used as well.
159. See note 160 & accompanying text infra.
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quently been questioned whether these benefits are not out-
weighed by the time, expense, and occasional untoward results
entailed by the traditional negative attitude toward authenticity
of writings.160
The USLTA's drafters concluded that the existing rules of
conveyancing formality are based on faith in the notarial ritual as
a deterrent to fraud and that the presence of a certificate of ac-
knowledgment on a conveyance does somewhat increase the
probability that the conveyance is genuine. 161 The value of the cer-
tificate, however, can be overstated. If a person were shown a pair
of conveyances taken from the real estate records, one conveyance
bearing and one lacking an acknowledgment certificate, and the
person were told to pick the "real" conveyance, the person likely
would pick the conveyance bearing the certificate. The probability
that the "real" conveyance was the one with the certificate would
not be one hundred percent, because the certificate could have
been forged or obtained by deceit, but the probability of genuine-
ness would be much greater for the acknowledged instrument. This
example is unpersuasive, however, as a justification for the authen-
tication rule because the rule presumes that one of the convey-
ances is counterfeit. In- fact, for any two such conveyances taken
from the real estate records, the probability should be very high
that both are genuine. Thus, the increased probability of genuine-
ness produced by the acknowledgment certificate is not very
significant.
The only argument left to proponents of the authentication
rule is that although writings are exactly what they appear to be
"in 99 out of 100 cases, 16 2 the need to root out fraud in the other
one percent is so imperative as to require the sacrifice of a certain
number of legitimate transactions,163 especially when the eviden-
tiary handicap can be avoided so easily through the use of a no-
tary. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the number of
instances of successful fraud in a world without the authentication
rule would exceed the number of legitimate transactions jeopard-
ized by the rule itself. The authentication rule assumes not only
that fraud will occur but also that the factfinder will fail to dis-
cover it. The jury will be deceived on occasion, of course, but the
160. McCoRMICK, supra note 104, § 218, at 544-45 (footnotes omitted).
161. See note 208 infra.
162. MCCORMICK, supra note 104, § 218, at 544.
163. See notes 129-33 & accompanying text supra.
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balance arguably tips in favor of accepting that risk rather than
the risk of invalidating legitimate conveyances.
The idea that the evidentiary handicap can be avoided easily
through the use of a notary exhibits a somewhat utopian attitude
towards prophylactic formality. Formal requirements might work
well in small populations with infrequent transactions handled by
highly skilled legal practitioners. The real estate market of late
20th century America, however, would bewilder the medieval
English conveyancer. In such a high volume market, mediated by a
conveyancing bar of varying skills, even the simple notarial ritual
can be an impractical requirement."" The transferee choosing a
less competent lawyer or trying to obtain real estate without a law-
yer's help should not necessarily bear the costs generated by the
propensity of some to commit fraud.
Abandoning the authentication rule would allow unacknowl-
edged, unproved conveyances to be admissible in evidence without
preliminary proof of authenticity. The drafters of the USLTA have
gone even further. Under the USLTA, a signed, physically re-
corded conveyance is not only admissible in evidence, but is en-
titled to a number of evidentiary presumptions, including a pre-
sumption of genuineness.6 5 The effect of the presumption extends
beyond a mere shift in the burden of going forward with evi-
dence. 66 The party opposing the signed, recorded conveyance has
the burden of persuading the factfinder that the probability of in-
authenticity is greater than the probability of genuineness.167 The
USLTA presumption thus radically departs from existing law be-
cause it elevates the status of an informal conveyance from pre-
sumptively inadmissible to presumptively genuine, and the pre-
sumption of genuineness is almost as strong as the presumption
now reserved for instruments bearing notarial certificates.16 8
The rationale for the USLTA presumption lies not so much in
the law of evidence 6 9 as in the law of property. Unless the discre-
tion of the factfinder is controlled by a strong presumption in favor
164. See note 129 & accompanying text supra.
165. See note 121 & accompanying text supra.
166. Cf. note 116 & accompanying text supra (jurisdictions in which notarial certifi-
cate shifts burden of producing evidence).
167. See note 122 & accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 118-19 & accompanying text supra.
169. Evidentiary principles probably would dictate at most a shift in the burden of
producing evidence. See cases cited at note 116 supra.
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of the authenticity of the instruments making up a transferee's
chain of title,170 the role of the recorded chain of conveyances as
title assurance is threatened. A transferee must be certain that the
conveyances he or she shows the jury not only are evidence of the
validity of the transfer but are persuasive evidence of its validity.
The USLTA presumption marginally increases the danger of
undiscovered fraud because a wrongdoer need only record a false
deed to shift the burden to disprove the authenticity of the forged
instrument to the other party. This enhanced opportunity for
wrongdoing may cause some legislatures to dilute the strength of
the USLTA presumption. However, the aggregate harm that would
be done by diluting the presumption-measured in increased inse-
curity of land titles-probably would exceed the aggregate harm of
some additional undiscovered fraud. Thus, nonuniform provisions
altering the strength of the USLTA presumption should be
discouraged.
Constructive Notice
The evidentiary burden imposed on defectively formalized
conveyances at least can be understood, if not justified. The pre-
vailing rule denying effect as constructive notice to physically re-
corded, but notarially defective conveyances defies rational expla-
nation. The baffling feature of the constructive notice rule as it
exists in most states is that, although the notarially deficient in-
strument is denied effect as constructive notice, persons who actu-
ally see the defective conveyance in the real estate records are
charged with actual notice of the conveyance and must take sub-
ject to it. In the few jurisdictions where a physically recorded copy
lacking prescribed formality is denied effect both as constructive
notice and as actual notice, the rule at least has the virtue of expli-
cability, being based partly on the same presumption of inauthen-
ticity that is the basis for the evidentiary handicap. As the Kansas
Supreme Court noted in Nordman v. Rau:17 1 "To hold that the
record of an unacknowledged conveyance, if known to a prospec-
tive buyer, amounts to actual notice of the instrument, is to com-
pel him to give it force as evidence, which the court itself would
170. The chain of title concept is discussed in the text accompanying notes 182-83
infra.
171. 86 Kan. 19, 119 P. 351 (1911).
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refuse it.' 1 72 The justification is unpersuasive. As the Nordman
dissent pointed out,'17 a purchaser should be charged at least with
inquiry notice. The license to ignore such a copy is particularly
questionable in light of the previous discussion of the authentica-
tion rule.174 Nevertheless, the Nordman rule does give the con-
structive notice handicap the virtue of conceptual coherence. If a
document will not count as actual notice when seen, it certainly
should not count as constructive notice. Once outside Kansas and
the few jurisdictions in which courts hold similarly, 175 however,
logical explanation of the constructive notice infirmity becomes
very difficult indeed. The infirmity cannot be based on a presump-
tion that the notarially deficient conveyance is inauthentic, be-
cause a purchaser who sees the instrument during a title search is
charged with actual notice and takes subject to the earlier
conveyance.1
76
Another ultimately fruitless analytical path is the hypothesis
that the constructive notice rule serves some policy of the record-
ing system. Professor Corwin Johnson has identified two governing
principles of American recording schemes: protecting those who
rely on the public record as a correct statement of title, and pun-
ishing those who fail to record.177 The punitive sanctions clearly
cannot be an end in themselves; they are a means of forcing recor-
dation178 in order to serve ends such as enhanced marketability.
The protection principle, on the other hand, seems to make sense
without any teleological justification. Those who rely on the public
record are acting consistently with legislative objectives and ought
to have their reliance interest protected.
The constructive notice infirmity cannot be said to serve the
protection principle because only those who have not relied on the
state of the record are given protection. Because a purchaser who
sees the informal conveyance in the records takes subject to it,
only the purchaser who fails to search the records or searches them
172. Id. at 22, 119 P. at 353. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
173. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
174. See notes 160-64 & accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 76-84 & accompanying text supra.
176. See note 66 & accompanying text supra.
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poorly can take free.'79 The interest in punishing those who fail to
record is not a satisfactory justification for the constructive notice
handicap, either, because it is not at all clear why the punishment
is being inflicted-surely not because the system wishes to en-
courage the use of notarial formality to strengthen the evidentiary
value of chains of title; the evidentiary handicap itself would seem
sufficient punishment. The punishment rationale, moreover, leaves
unexplained the distinction under the constructive notice rules be-
tween those who find the defectively acknowledged conveyance
and those who do not find it. It makes no sense to punish the
"nonrecorder" only in those cases in which the subsequent pur-
-chaser fails to make a reasonable title search.
Finally, if the consequences associated with the acknowledg-
ment or proof requirement are justifiable as tools of the punish-
ment principle, the question remains whether that principle itself
is justified. "[W]hat purpose, other than protection of those who
rely, or are likely to rely, upon the records, is of sufficient magni-
tude to warrant depriving one of his land for failure to record?...
[T]he recording system provides no fund for compensating those
whose titles are cut off."180
So long as the conveyancing rules generally treat an instru-
ment lacking notarial formality as valid between the parties and
against those with actual notice, there is insufficient reason for de-
nying the instrument effect as constructive notice when placed in
the records. The constructive notice device itself reflects the prin-
ciple that potential purchasers should make reasonable title
searches or be bound by what they would have found in such
searches.181 The principle should apply equally in the case of the
notarially informal conveyance.
Eligibility for Recording
Most of the discussion thus far has focused on the evidentiary
and constructive notice consequences of the statutes limiting eligi-
bility for recording to properly formalized conveyances, but the
concept of eligibility for recording includes another notion: The
official custodian of the real estate records has the power to reject
179. See text following note 70 supra.
180. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IowA L. REV. 231, 244
(1962).
181. See J. CRIBBET, PINCnILES OF THE LAW OP PROPERTY 279, 293 (2d ed. 1975).
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ineligible documents offered for recordation.
In a jurisdiction that imposes either evidentiary or construc-
tive notice penalties on physically recorded conveyances lacking
prescribed formality, it is sensible also to empower, or even re-
quire, the official recorder to reject formally deficient instruments
offered for recordation. Having the recorder assume a guardianship
role achieves more than the somewhat paternalistic goal of protect-
ing a transferee from the consequences of his or her ignorance or
imprudence; it also preserves the "marketability function" of the
recording statutes. The alienability of Blackacre depends upon a
seller holding good title to Blackacre. A purpose of the recording
acts is to maximize the alienability of land by minimizing doubt
about sellers' titles. One element of the Anglo-American theory of
land ownership is that the legitimacy of X's title to Blackacre can
depend not only on the validity of the transaction in which X be-
came the "owner," but also on the validity of previous transactions
in X's "chain of title. 1 82 A weak link anywhere in the chain may
imperil X's claim of ownership. Recording systems ideally create
public records showing the chains of title, giving a prospective pur-
chaser the opportunity to evaluate the chain of title to determine
the strength of the seller's title.1 83 Perhaps more significantly, the
systems can require that the records be made in such a way that
the chains of title actually are strengthened. If the recorder turns
away all conveyances lacking prescribed formality, chains of title
are strengthened.
The marketability justification for assigning a guardianship
role to the recorder depends on the desirability of retaining either
the evidentiary infirmity or the constructive notice handicap cur-
rently imposed on conveyances lacking prescribed formality. If the
evidentiary infirmity and the constructive notice handicap were
abolished, then chains of title that included instruments lacking
notarial formality would not be significantly ' weaker than chains
182. BAsYE, supra note 100, § 2, at 6.
183. Id. § 5, at 30; Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IowA L.
Rav. 231, 243 (1962).
184. The presence of a notarial certificate would produce some additional security in
those jurisdictions where the burden is on the party opposing the conveyancing to show
inauthenticity by clear and convincing evidence. See notes 118-19 & accompanying text
supra. The clear and convincing evidence standard is more difficult to establish than the
balance of probabilities standard under the USLTA. Thus, careful conveyancers still may
elect to complete the acknowledgment ritual in a jurisdiction that has adopted the USLTA
to gain the advantage of the clear and convincing evidence standard. Another reason to
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of title composed entirely of acknowledged or proved conveyances,
and the utility of having the recorder guard against formally defi-
cient instruments would almost entirely disappear. Thus, the sub-
stantial administrative cost presumably involved in a diligent re-
view of the formalities present in all incoming conveyances 18 5 could
be saved.
Empowering the recorder to turn away instruments lacking
proper notarial formality might be justified as a means of thwart-
ing the species of conveyancing fraud that does not involve deceiv-
ing the judicial factfinder. A wrongdoer who is a complete stranger
to the title may record a false deed showing title in himself or her-
self. The victim who relies on the record and gives value to the
wrongdoer loses both the land and the money. If the recorder re-
jects informal instruments offered for recording, the danger of this
sort of mischief is reduced.
The justification for the recorder's duty as a guardian of au-
thenticity, however, overestimates both the vigilance of the average
recorder and the effectiveness of the notarial device as a deterrent
to fraud. In a high volume real estate market, those in charge of
official land records generally pay little attention to the niceties of
notarial formality when taking instruments for recording. 186 More-
over, even if one assumes that recordkeepers are vigilant, there is
reason to doubt whether a wrongdoer sophisticated enough to ma-
nipulate the recording system to perpetrate a fraud would be de-
terred by the necessity of a certificate of acknowledgment. Surely a
certificate could be manufactured with relative ease, or the wrong-
doer could choose a notary who lacked the time or the shrewdness
to detect an imposter.' Finally, if the notary is an effective guard
expect continued use of the notary is that the USLTA does not alter the authentication rule
for unrecorded conveyances. See notes 115-19 & accompanying text supra.
185. But see note 186 infra.
186. "Alas, too many recording officers have not observed ... irregularities and have
accepted and recorded countless numbers of imperfect instruments having substantial infir-
mities in their acknowledgments." BASYE, supra note 100, § 241, at 541. "This statement of
Professor Basye accords with the comment made by a lawyer correspondent in North Caro-
lina that the trouble with the records in his county is that 'the clerk would allow love letters
to be recorded if accompanied by the requisite recording fee.'" Webster, Toward Greater
Marketability of Land Titles-Remedying the Defective Acknowledgment Syndrome, 46
N.C.L. REv. 56, 63 n.26 (1967). "[Olne wag tells of the county clerk who would put a menu
on record if a fee were tendered." J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 279, 280
(2d ed. 1975).
187. "Phony Notary seals on fraudulent property deeds are appearing with increasing
frequency in the nation's high-volume real estate markets.
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against fraud, nothing prevents transferees from insisting on
acknowledged instruments, whatever the law may be regarding
proper recording. Thus, on balance, a rule allowing recordkeepers
to turn away notarially informal conveyances can be said to do lit-
tle good and cause little harm-hardly a persuasive argument for
invoking the bureaucratic machinery.
None of the consequences now associated with the notarial
prerequisites for recording can be adequately justified. Therefore,
USLTA section 2-301, which abolishes all such prerequisites, 18
ought to be adopted.
Traditional Justifications for Legal Formality
Apart from the specific evidentiary and recording issues, sev-
eral arguments used primarily in the context of wills might be ad-
vanced for maintaining conveyancing formality. The applicability
of these general justifications to conveyancing is outlined below.
The Evidentiary Justification
Some disputes, such as those involving the validity of a pur-
ported formal will, inevitably arise because the testator or other
transferor is not present to testify. In such cases the legal system
has been reluctant to trust the usual modes of proof available in
the judicial factfinding process.18 9 Thus, formal devices such as at-
testation and acknowledgment have been required to assure the
court that the testator's signature was not forged and that the in-
strument was signed with the proper intent.190
Although this rationale for the use of formality superficially
resembles the evidentiary rules about conveyancing formality, fail-
"Reports from law enforcement agencies and Notary-commissioning officials in several
states indicate increasing use of phony seals-either counterfeits duplicating valid Notary
seals or seals acquired using false names.
"Most often, the seals are imprinted on fraudulent property grant deeds on which a
swindler has forged the signatures of the property owner and listed himself as purchaser. He
then has the fraudulent deed recorded and 'sells' the property to an unsuspecting mortgage
company at a discount rate or uses it as collateral to obtain a loan.
"Another scam is for a swindler to pose as a lender in order to receive FHA or GI loan
insurance as compensation for fictitious default on a home loan." THE NATIONAL NOTARY,
Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 14.
188. See note 95 & accompanying text supra.
189. Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1941) [hereinafter cited as Gulliver & Tilson].
190. Id. at 6-9.
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ure to comply with prescribed formality under the wills acts voids
the instrument altogether.91 The factfinder simply is not trusted
with evidence of the genuineness of the will other than the evi-
dence produced by compliance with the statutory formality. As
already noted,192 however, in the overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions a conveyance is valid between the parties although unac-
knowledged, unproved, and unwitnessed. The evidentiary conse-
quences of informality, moreover, reflect a clear willingness to trust
the usual factfinding process; a conveyance lacking a proper ac-
knowledgment is admissible in evidence if some further proof of
due execution is presented.193
The Cautionary Justification
Formal devices also have been justified as checks against in-
considerate action. The use of the seal in its original form is an
example: "The affixing and impressing of a wax wafer-symbol in
the popular mind of legalism and weightiness-was an excellent
device for inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate
in one pledging his future. To a lesser extent any requirement of a
writing, of course, serves the same purpose, as do requirements of
attestation, notarization, etc."'
The cautionary justification is a weak explanation for the re-
quirement of conveyancing formality for the same reason that the
evidentiary function is an unsatisfactory rationale: If the rules re-
quiring acknowledgments and kindred rituals were meant to serve
a cautionary purpose, the logical consequence of noncompliance
would be invalidity of the instrument, but a conveyance generally
is valid between the parties and against all with actual notice de-
spite the lack of a proper notarial certificate. The constructive no-
tice rules, which generally protect only those third parties who fail
to search the real estate records with ordinary care, do not func-
tion as a check against inconsiderate action by grantors.195
191. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1975).
192. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 105-14 & accompanying text supra.
194. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941).
195. Another reason for the irrelevance of the cautionary function in the conveyancing
context is suggested by the contrast to a wills context: "A will is said to be revocable and
ambulatory, meaning that it becomes operative only on death. Because the testator does not
part with the least incident of ownership when he makes a will, and does not experience the
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The Protective Justification
In discussing the formalities mandated by wills acts, courts
have noted that some formalities are a means to protect the testa-
tor against imposition at the time of execution."' The assumption
underlying these prophylactic measures, for example, that attest-
ing witnesses sign in the presence of the testator and that the wit-
nesses be disinterested,19 7 is that imposition otherwise would likely
go undetected.9 8 The use of formalities as a guard against imposi-
tions arises in other legal contexts as well. Many early American
statutes required a wife to acknowledge before a neutral official her
willingness to join in a proposed conveyance by her husband,
thereby releasing her rights in the land. 99
Again, however, if the modern rules about conveyancing for-
mality were meant to guard against undetected imposition, failure
to complete the notarial ritual would void the conveyance between
the parties. Even assuming that the protective function is a ratio-
nale for conveyancing formality, arguments for eliminating this
function are convincing. As has been argued in the wills context, 00
'wrench of delivery' required for inter vivos gifts, the danger exists that he may make seem-
ing testamentary dispositions inconsiderately, without adequate forethought and finality of
intention." Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
494-95 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
196. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 189, at 9.
197. Id. at 10-11.
198. Id. at 9.
199. For example, an early Georgia statute provided: "Whereas, the usual method of
conveying lands and tenements in England, by feme coverts, is by fine or recovery, which
methods have not been practiced in any of his Majesty's American colonies: And whereas,
instead thereof, it has been customary in the conveyances of land by husband and wife, for
the wife to acknowledge her consent before a judge or justice, being first privately examined
by the said judge or justice whether she acknowledged the same voluntarily and freely ....
"Be it therefore enacted. . . that. . . where a feme covert has or may have any right
in part or the whole of the lands and tenements to be conveyed, and the said feme covert
doth willingly consent to part with her right, by becoming a party with her husband in the
sale of such lands and tenements, in such cases as these the said feme covert shall become a
party with her husband in the said deed of conveyance, and sign and seal the same before
the chief-justice or assistant judges, or one of his Majesty's justices of the peace for the
parish where such contracts shall be made, declaring before the said judge or justice, that
she has joined with her husband in the alienation of the said lands and tenements of her
own free will and consent, without any compulsion or force used by her said husband to
oblige her so to do. . . ." Act of April 24, 1760, reprinted in THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS
OF THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA 1755-1770, at 85-86 (Glazier 1978).
200. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 189, at 9-13. Significantly, the authors state
during the course of their analysis of the protective function in the wills context that they
could discern no such purpose for the formal requirements for inter vivos dispositions.
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every formality "should have a clearly demonstrable affirmative
value"20 1 because failure to comply-with one formality may jeop-
ardize an otherwise valid transaction.20 2 Furthermore, civil and
possible criminal liability may be more effective deterrents to
fraud.203
The Channeling Justification
The legal system and the parties to transactions both are argu-
ably benefited if the legal system states, before any transactions
have occurred, that a transaction employing the formal device X
will be given legal effect Y by the courts. The legal system benefits
because the courts are able quickly and accurately to identify
transactions intended by the parties to have legal effect Y. The
parties benefit because formal device X is a relatively unambigu-
ous symbol they can employ with certainty to communicate with
each other, with third parties, and with the courts. This concept
has been called "the channeling function" of legal formality.2 0
The seal, for example, which induced a circumspect frame of mind
in its user, also "serve[d] to mark or signalize the enforceable
promise.
'205
The notarial device, like all formalities, has some channeling
effect. A recorded, acknowledged deed is a relatively clear signal
that the parties intended to effect a conveyance. The channeling
justification is not persuasive, however, unless it is first assumed
that the channeling advantage outweighs the costs of prescribed
formality and, second, that the channeling advantage could not be
substantially secured in some less costly fashion. A less costly al-
ternative is available: the simple act of recording a signed instru-
ment would be a sufficiently clear signal of the parties' intentions.
Acknowledgment is a superfluous signal.
The negative channeling effect 206 also must be considered. The
statute of frauds, for example, has such a negative effect because it
offers a means to assure one of not being bound.0 7 The rules about
Id. at 9.
201. Id.
202. See notes 56-94 & accompanying text supra.
203. USLTA § 2-201, Comment 3; see also Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 189, at 9.
204. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1941).
205. Id. at 801.




conveyancing formality cannot be explained on those grounds,
again because the consequence of noncompliance is not complete
invalidity of the conveyance; the instrument is valid between the
parties and against third persons with notice.
Conclusion
Reform of American conveyancing formality is not a new sub-
ject for scholars208 or legislatures,20 9 but prior to the USLTA no
comprehensive challenge had been presented to the traditional
uses of formality in the context of land transfers. The onus of the
current law is clear. Legitimate transactions deserving legal protec-
tion are put at risk. The effectiveness of the notarial institution is
particularly questionable in a high volume real estate market
where the tendency inevitably is to reduce the notarial ritual to
one more operation in the assembly-line production of a completed
land transfer. The USLTA's drafters concluded that "[w]hatever
the office of notary public once was, other methods, in particular
civil liability for slander of title and possible criminal sanctions
now appear to provide more effective and less burdensome meth-
ods of discouraging fraudulent behavior."110 The USLTA provi-
sions abolishing the evidentiary and constructive notice handicaps
now imposed on physically recorded but notarially deficient con-
veyances deserve the careful attention of the state legislatures.
208. E.g., BAsYE, supra note 100, § 241, at 540; Maxwell, The Hidden Defect in Ac-
knowledgment and Title Security, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 83 (1954); Webster, Toward Greater
Marketability of Land Titles-Remedying the Defective Acknowledgment Syndrome, 46
N.C.L. REV. 56, 63 n.26 (1967).
209. See notes 134-52 & accompanying text supra.
210. USLTA § 2-201, Comment 3.
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